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THE CORPORATE PERSONA, CONTRACT (AND
MARKET) FAILURE, AND MORAL VALUES
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*

Over the past twenty years, economic analysis has had a profound
impact on the reformulation of currentlegal doctrine In the context of
corporategovernance law, adherents to the Chicago school of economics
attack the fiduciary model, arguingthat it interfereswith the marketfor
corporate control and thus impedes profit maximization. Viewing the
corporation as simply a nexus of contracts, these scholars would eliminate the fiduciaryparadigm and substitute a contract model for corporategovernance under which corporate constituents could bargainfreely
with one another to define their rights and responsibilities.
Professor Hazen rejects the argument that application of contract
theory to corporate lawjustifies the total annihilationoffiduciaryprinciples in the area of corporate governance. He points to the flaws of the
contract model, in theory and in practice, and to itsfailure to recognize
that the corporationis more than purely an economic entity, but a powerful social andpolitical institution as well Although he acknowledges
that contractariananalysisprovides useful insight into the modern definition of the corporatepersona,ProfessorHazen concludes that complete
reliance on the allegedly "neutral" contract model is unsound; instead,
to compensatefor the unequalbargainingstrength between parties to the
corporate contract, the proper formulation of the corporate paradigm
must include, ratherthan reject, societal values embodied in traditional
fiduciaryprinciples.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The business corporation is a form of doing business wherein the shareholders pool their money into a common enterprise. In the absence of statute, this
type of business organization would be a partnership. In a partnership, each
partner is jointly liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership.' Furthermore, in the absence of contractual restrictions, each partner has managerial
authority.2 By contrast, when investors pool their funds into the corporate form
they enjoy limited liability. In addition, corporate statutes contemplate a centralized management. Thus, the business and affairs of a corporation are managed under the direction of the board of directors3 which is elected by the
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Co-

lumbia University. I would like to thank Joanie Pettinelli, UNC Law class of 1990, for her research
assistance.
1. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 15(b) (1914).
2. See, e.g., id. § 9.
3. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1983); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.01 (1984).
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shareholders. 4 Officers of the corporation, who are appointed by the directors,
carry on the day-to-day management of the company.5 Except in the case of
closely held corporations, 6 this centralization of management generally results in
a separation of ownership from control of the corporation. Thus, subject to a
few exceptions, 7 corporate managers have virtually complete power over the
shareholders' investment. To protect against management self-dealing and to
assure the achievement of the shareholders' goals (which generally amount to
some form of wealth maximization), the law traditionally has recognized that
corporate managers stand as fiduciaries vis-A-vis the shareholders.
Given the wide dispersal of shareholder voting power in large companies, in
most cases shareholder control is illusory. Management can perpetuate itself:
incumbent managers typically nominate the directors, who in turn appoint the
officers. While this situation appears to call for strict enforcement of managers'
fiduciary obligations, the law and scholarly commentary have been moving in
the opposite direction based on the argument that fiduciary principles impede
profit maximization. For example, under the fiduciary paradigm, managers may
be able to perpetuate their own positions and thereby fend off hostile bidders
who might actually increase the maximization of shareholder wealth. Thus,
many commentators argue that the fiduciary model interferes with the free market; the check against inefficient management of large corporations is said to be
the market for corporate control rather than the fiduciary paradigm. To the
extent that management is inefficient in managing a company's assets, the market will devalue the shares, rendering the company an attractive takeover target.
As such, many observers posit that the market provides management an incentive to manage efficiently. 8 By the use of various entrenchment techniques, however, corporate managers have found ways to thwart takeovers without
necessarily improving their managerial skills. Also, because the leveraged financing boom made takeovers much easier, corporate raiders shifted their focus
from poorly managed companies to companies with a sufficient cash flow to
support the large financing costs. 9
The current genre of economic analysis argues that the fiduciary paradigm
of corporate governance should be replaced by a contract model under which
the various corporate constituents can contract freely with one another and
thereby define their own relative rights and responsibilities. This contractarian
model is not merely theoretical. Indeed, it has influenced some significant
4. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§

141(b) (1983);

§ 8.03 (1984).

Rv.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP.

AcT

5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1983); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§§ 8.40-8.41 (1984).

6. In closely held corporations there frequently is an identity of owners and managers.
7. There are some major transactions that require shareholder approval. For example, corporate statutes generally preserve a shareholder vote for mergers and sales of substantially all the
corporation's assets not in the regular course of business. See REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT

§§ 11.03, 12.02 (1984). Charter amendments, including changes in the number of authorized shares,
generally require shareholder approval. See id. § 10.03.
8. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.

9. The collapse of many highly leveraged companies and the junk bond market in general has
demonstrated the questionable wisdom of this easy money environment.
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changes in the law in this direction. 10
This Article examines the demise of the fiduciary principle in corporate
governance and argues that it should be strengthened rather than vitiated.
Although the contractarian model has surface appeal (as is the case with many
economic models), it cannot withstand a hard-look analysis. Even on a theoretical level, the current version of the contract model fails because its application to
corporate law does not logically call for the abandonment of the fiduciary model.
Furthermore, in constructing their model of corporate governance, the contractarians do not abide by traditionally recognized contract principles; instead,
they present theoretical models that fail when practically applied. This Article
argues that a proper application of contract principles includes, rather than rejects, fiduciary principles in corporate law.
The discussion begins in Section II with a brief overview of the roles of
economic analysis in general and other trends in current legal scholarship. The
examination of the basis of the fiduciary paradigm in Section III is followed by a
discussion of the contract model both in theory and in practice in Section IV.
Section V analyzes the shortcomings of the contract model in terms of legal
theory. The Article continues, in Section VI, with a discussion of the role of
values in the law as it relates to the contractarian model. Section VII then
briefly reviews two other models of corporate structure that also point to the
limitations of the contract model. Finally, the Article concludes that, although
the contract theory provides useful insight to corporate law, it is flawed because
it purports to justify the annihilation of the role of fiduciary principles.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE

OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND CURRENT

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The contract model of corporate governance is part of a larger economic
analysis. Contractarian analysis constitutes only one in a series of assaults by
the Chicago economists upon traditional notions of law. In many ways, this
form of economic analysis has provided insight into the ways in which law in
general has developed. It also has provided a method for testing traditional
rules of law against one hypothesis of the proper role of the law. While economic analysis undoubtedly is helpful, it does not provide the complete answer
to all of our problems. Furthermore, economic analysis, like any paradigm,
brings with it its own biases and shortcomings.
Economists-primarily from the Chicago school-have challenged traditional legal doctrine in various fields of law. Many of these economists claim
that the law should take its direction from a value-neutral economic analysis."I
10. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983) (permitting charter provisions limiting or
eliminating director liability for breaches of the duty of care); see infra text accompanying notes 3337.
11. See, eg., McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the CorporateField: A Critique of
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1530 (1989); see also Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to The Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990) (arguing that contractual theory and economic literature support unrestricted private ordering of corporate management's
duties).
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Some observers argue that economic analysis essentially is descriptive and that
any normative effect is secondary. 1 2 Rejecting principles of natural law, traditional legal realism, and formalism, economic analysis mainly purports to describe legal doctrine.1 3 Some of its proponents also argue that economic analysis
results in positive normative consequences. In short, the supposedly neutral
principle of economic efficiency 14 is said to be a better guiding light than previous bases of legal theory. 15 Saying that the answer lies in "efficiency," however,
does not end the matter, as there are different perceptions of what the term
"efficiency" means. For example, some economists frame their analyses in terms
of Pareto optimality, 16 while others adhere to the Kaldor-Hicks model.17
Economic analysis tells us that even if we value efficiency as the goal of a
productive economy and of business regulation, rules of law are necessary. Specifically, rules of law are needed to counteract market failure. Like the term
"efficiency," however, market failure can be defined several ways. For example,
market failure may occur when transactions do not result from meaningful consent of both parties.18 Alternatively, market failure can be defined purely in
19
terms of "efficiency" and "rationality" as the economists use those terms.
12. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 2.1 (2d ed. 1973). But see Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 228-29 (1980).
13. Eg., R. POSNER, supra note 12, § 2.1. Posner would classify his economic analysis as legal
realism insofar as legal realism says that law is not distinct from policy. On the other hand, he
departs from legal realism insofar as it proclaims that law is not a science.
14. For a discussion of two types of efficiency models, see infra notes 16-17; see also Coleman,
Efficiency, Exchange andAuction: PhilosophicAspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF.

L. REv. 221 (1980).
15. The focus on efficiency as a goal is really a variation on utilitarian philosophy. Indeed, one
commentator suggests that equating shareholder wealth maximization with the proper outcome
stems from a "crude sort of utilitarianism." Stone, CorporateSocialResponsibility: What it Might
Mean if it Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. REv. 557, 570 (1986).
16. As one commentator explains:
Any discussion of Pareto efficiency must begin with definitions of Pareto optimality, Pareto
superiority, and Pareto inferiority. To claim that resources or goods are allocated in a
Pareto-optimal fashion is to maintain that any further reallocation of resources will benefit
one person only at the expense of another. An allocation of resources is Pareto superior to
an alternative allocation if and only if no person is disadvantaged by it and the lot of at
least one person is improved. An allocation of resources is Pareto inferior to another if
there is a distribution of Pareto superior to it. The concepts of Pareto superiority and
optimality are analytically connected in the following way: A Pareto-optimal distribution
has no distributions superior to it.
J. COLEMAN MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 71-72 (1988).
17. Again, as explained by Professor Coleman:
A redistribution of resources is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if under the redistribu.
tion the winners win enough so that they could compensate the losers. The notion of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that the winners actually compensate the losers.
In effect, a redistribution is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if it is a "possible" Paretosuperior position.

Id. at 84; see also Coleman, supranote 14. The suggestion that it is unnecessary to actually compensate the losers has influenced much of the law and economics writing. See, e.g., R. POSNErs, supra
note 12, § 2.1.
18. See Eisenberg, The BargainPrincipleandIts Limits, 95 HARv. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (1982).
19. For example, one commentator defines market failure as follows:
Within the rational choice perspective, rational cooperation is a response to market failure.
Market failure in turn is simply the failure of agents acting on purely individually maximizing strategies to secure a Pareto optimal or collectively rational outcome.
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Some observers claim that when legal rules designed to counteract market failure involve redistribution, those rules are inconsistent with a rational view of the
law when rationality is defined in terms of market efficiency. As Professor Coleman has explained:
Legal rules are a species of rational constraints-the components
of a scheme of rational cooperation. Constraints cannot be rational for
all actors if they are entirely redistributive in character. Such constraints improve the welfare of some only at the expense of others.
Consequently, a set of legal rules designed to move resources along the
Pareto frontier from one optimal outcome to another could not be rational for each agent. Thus, the view that law or politics is entirely
redistributive, in this sense, is incompatible with the rational choice
perspective. 20
The mere fact that a rule of law is redistributive and therefore may not
reflect the rational choice of each agent does not mean that the rule is without
justification. 2 1 Redistribution may be necessary to counteract an imbalance that
otherwise would exist. As discussed below, 22 the absence of meamingful consent
in the corporate setting creates a sufficient imbalance to warrant interference
with the freedom of contract model.
Economic analysis is in fact only one of several new schools of legal scholarship. Other scholarly trends have appeared, at least in part, in response to the
law and economics scholarship. For example, over recent years critical legal
theorists (colloquially known as "crits") have become quite prolific. Critical
legal theory provides useful insight into corporate law analysis to the extent that
it tells us that law must be "contextualized. '2 3 Critical legal theorists dismiss
law and economics as addressing only one aspect of the problem. This type of
attack on the legal economists has gone far beyond the critical legal studies
movement. In fact, a number of writers who formerly seemed committed to law
and economics have since recognized the need to consider the lessons to be
Coleman,Afterward: The Rational ChoiceApproach to Legal Rules, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 177, 179
(1989) [hereinafter Coleman, Afterward]; see also D. GAUTHIER, MoRALs BY AGREEMENT 21-69
(1986) (analyzing utility, preference, and rational choice); Coleman, supra note 14, at 221-23 (testing

various law and economic concepts); Kraus &Coleman, Morality and the Theory of RationalChoice,
97 ETHics 715 (1987) (examining the relationship between morality and rationality).
20. Coleman, Afterward, supra note 19, at 179.
21. The proponents of law and economics say that economic analysis leads to the proper result
when there are low transaction costs. In such a case, the market is said to bring the transaction to

the optimal decision and guides the parties to a rational choice. In a market transaction the agreement of both parties results not only in individual rationality but also in collective rational choice.

Id.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 155-66.
23. In order to "contextualize" a given subject it must be viewed in terms of every context in
which it exists. For example, relying simply on economic concepts ignores the other contexts in
which the corporation must be considered. Some critical legal theorists take their position too far
and dismiss all of corporate law as additional evidence of a politically corrupt system. For criticism
of such an extreme approach, see Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate
Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865 (1990); see also Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final
Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of CorporateLaw, 43 VAND. L. REV.85 (1990) (exploring
influence of interest groups on court outcomes).
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learned from other branches of the social sciences. 24 There is thus a growing
recognition that an economic analysis of the law can benefit from the teachings
25
of other social science disciplines.
How does a contextualized approach apply to the field of corporate law?

First, we must not forget that corporations are not simply economic institutions;
they are also political and social institutions. There is much legal scholarship

today that underscores the importance of relationships in defining and understanding the law.2 6 The entire law of corporations was built upon the complex
relationships formed within the corporate setting. The fiduciary paradigm de-

veloped at least in part because of these relational interests.
III.
A.

THE FIDUCIARY PARADIGM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Basis of the FiduciaryParadigm

As noted at the outset of this Article, shareholders entrust the success of
their investment to corporate managers who control the corporate assets. It has
long been a basic tenet of corporate law, reflected in the case law27 and in the
view of commentators, 28 that corporate managers owe a fiduciary obligation to
the corporation and to its shareholders. 29 Traditionally, there have been two

prongs of corporate managers' fiduciary duty. First is their duty of loyalty. The
potential for conflicts of interest in the modem business world led the law to
recognize that corporate managers may have interests that do not always coin24. See, eg., Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailtyto RationalActors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 Cni.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).
25. See, ag., A. ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988);
Ellickson, supra note 24; Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences, 53 U. Cn. L. REV.
1129 (1986).
26. For example, the power model and the communitarianism theory are based on relationships. For a discussion of the power model of the corporation, see infra text accompanying notes
252-73; and, for a discussion of communitarianism, see infra text accompanying notes 246-51.
27. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729-30 (Del. 1988) ("The
exercise of this managerial power is tempered by fundamental fiduciary obligations owed by the
directors to the corporation and its shareholders."); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986)
("In performing their duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation and its shareholders."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("fundamental
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders"); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939) ("While technically not trustees, [directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders."); Schwarzwaelder v. German Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 59 N.J. Eq. 589, 590
(N.J. 1899) ("the fiduciary duty which [directors] owe to the members of the corporation"); Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 389 (N.Y. 1817) ("mThe persons who, from time to

time, exercise the corporate powers, may, in their character of trustees, be accountable to this Court
for a fraudulent breach of trust.").
28. H. W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 114 (1927); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 325 (3d ed. 1983); W.
KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.06 (4th ed.

1988); Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U.L. REv. 12 (1939).
29. For a statute that sets forth this principle explicitly, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (repealed
by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (1990)) ("Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders."). With the adoption of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, it is unfortunate that the new North Carolina Act no longer speaks explicitly in terms of management's fiduciary obligations. See infra note 33 (discussing REV. MODEL
BUSINESS COP.: ACT § 8.30 (1984)).

1991]

CORPORATE PERSONA

cide with the interests of the shareholders. Because managers control the shareholders' assets, managers must place the corporation's and the shareholders'

interests above their own.30 Borrowed from trust law, the duty of loyalty is
firmly ingrained in both the case law31 and statutes. 32 The duty of loyalty is

based on a shareholder supremacy model under which the interests of the directors must yield to their obligations to the shareholders.
The second prong of managers' fiduciary duty is their duty of care. Because
managers are entrusted with the shareholders' property, they are held to a stan-

dard of reasonable care in dealing with that property. 33 This obligation arises
irrespective of whether the directors have a self interest in the transactions in
question.
A corollary to the duty of care is that, in the absence of a conflict of inter-

est, there is a presumption that directors have validly exercised their business
judgment. This "business judgment rule," which has existed for more than 160

years, 34 requires courts to defer to a director's judgment in passing on the validity of his or her decision making. The rule thus insulates directors from liability
for lack of care in all but the most egregious cases. 35 Moreover, fear of substan-

tial liability led many legislatures to reduce or otherwise limit statutorily the
directors' duty of care. 36 Notwithstanding the recent wave of scholarly literature and legislative backlash, however, in light of the dearth of decisions imposing liability, 3 7 it cannot fairly be said that the directors' duty of care has unduly
30. For an excellent analysis of the rise of conflict of interest rules, see Marsh, Are Directors
Trustees? Conflict ofInterest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
31. See id. at 53-57.
32. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983) (transactions in which directors have an interest); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.31 (1984) (director conflict of interest). In fact, the
conflict of interest rules are so firmly ingrained that the Delaware charter opt-out provision, which
permits limitation of corporate managers' liability to the corporation, does not apply to conflict of
interest situations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983).
33. The duty of care has many statutory formulations. See eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a)
(West 1983) ("A director shall perform the duties of a director ... in good faith, in a manner such
director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such
care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(a) ("in good faith and with that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances");
REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984) ("A director shall discharge his duties as a
director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation").
34. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. 68, 77-78 (La. 1829).
35. See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (2d
ed. 1988) (describing the contours of the rule). Although a number of decisions discuss the duty of
care, most have arisen in the context of alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty. There have been only
a handful of cases invoking the duty of care in the absence of a conflict of interest. Bates v. Dresser,
251 U.S. 524, 530 (1920); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 45, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (1981); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 79 (1880);
O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 927, 177 S.E. 852, 860 (1935); cf Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding director negligence but denying liability due to
failure to prove a causal connection between the director's inattentiveness and the corporate loss).
36. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983); see generally Hazen, CorporateDirectors'
Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1987) [hereinafter
Hazen, The Second Lap] (examining statutory provisions decreasing corporate director liability).
37. See Hazen, The Second Lap, supra note 36, at 171 n.5.
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fettered the discretion of corporate management.
Over the past twenty years, the fiduciary model of corporate governance
has come under attack. On the theoretical level, economists proffer a contractarian view of the corporation as a substitute for the traditional fiduciary
model. 38 The economists tend to take what might be called a paradigmatic historical view: that the theory of the firm has had various paradigms over time
and that each new paradigm replaces its predecessor. A helpful approach would
seem to be to view each paradigm as providing additional insight to the problem
of understanding the corporate persona. The contractarian paradigm certainly
adds insight into the proper role of law in corporate regulation. Viewing contractarianism as a justification for the elimination of fiduciary obligations, however, is a mistake.

39

Unfortunately, the movement away from a fiduciary paradigm of corporate
governance has not been limited to theoretical discourse. The 1984 revision of
the Model Business Corporation Act ("revised Model Act") omits from the text
of the statute any reference to the directors' fiduciary duties. 4° The drafters of
the revised Model Act noted that this omission was not intended to change the
current law relating to directors' and managers' responsibility. Rather, the re41
formulation was designed to eliminate unhelpful analogies to the law of trusts.
42
As others have shown, however, the trust analogy has been very useful. Furthermore, the elimination of an express fiduciary obligation may well lead courts
to unduly relax directors and managers obligations.
The reason for using the word "fiduciary" in the context of corporate managers' duties is to draw an analogy to trust law. At the same time, however, it is
necessary to recognize that corporate managers (as "trustees") should and can
take risks that ordinary trustees cannot. For example, although the goal of a
traditional trust instrument is capital preservation and slow growth with adequate provision for a desired income stream, 43 corporate managers, by contrast,
are encouraged to be less risk averse than trustees in their pursuit of economic
gain for the corporation." The fact that fiduciary concepts have a different ap38. See infra note 74.

39. For an example of a middle-of-the-road view, see the discussion of Professor Coffee's approach in the text accompanying infra notes 76-85; see also Coffee, The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) [hereinafter

Coffee, Balance] (characterizing corporate law as both enabling and mandatory).
40. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984). It is not clear, however, whether the
source of this change was the practicing lawyers involved in the drafting process or the Chief Reporter, Professor Robert Hamilton, himself an academic. See Goldstein, The RelationshipBetween
the Model Business CorporationAct and the Principlesof Corporate Governance. Analysis and Recommendations, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 501 (1984).
41. As the official comments explain: "Section 8.30 does not use the term 'fiduciary' in the
standard for directors' conduct because the term could be confused with some of the unique attrib-

utes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which are not appropriate
for directors of a corporation." REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 official comment (1984).
42. E.g., Dodd, supra note 28, at 1158-60.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 176, 181, 227 (1959); G. G. BOGERT & G. T.
BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 99, 101 (5th ed. 1973); A. SCOTT & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 176, 181, 227 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
44. See, eg., W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1041
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plication in the trust setting does not mean that they should be discarded completely when evaluating corporate paradigms.
B.

An HistoricalPerspective

It is a serious mistake to view the corporate entity apart from its "historical
development.4 5 The contract paradigm of corporate existence is far from a new
one.46 Observers have long recognized that the corporation is a series (or nexus)
of contractual relationships. 47 The current contractarian view, however, disregards the fact that the sovereign is a party to this corporate contract. 48 The
49
history of the corporate form makes this fact clear.
The original impetus for corporate regulation was spurred by forces that
result in public law generally,50 rather than the private law focus that is seized
upon by the contractarians. Under the contractarian view of corporate law, the

various participants in the corporation do not differ "in the slightest degree from
ordinary market contracting between any two people."'' s

Corporate regulation developed out of the concern for the antisocial impact
of corporations. It was recognized that the corporation could be a "socially

useful instrument of economic growth."'5 2 As one commentator observed long
ago:
A private corporation is a voluntary union of persons, joined to-

gether by written articles of association or incorporation under legislative authority, or by special statute on proper application to the
legislature to accomplish some pecuniary or ideal purpose authorized
(Penn. ed. 1986); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, § 242; Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the ConstrainedPrudentMan Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. R v. 52 (1987).
45. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectivesfrom History, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). As Professor Bratton explains, the contractarian model is not as novel

as some would have us believe: "[Miany of the component notions of the new economic theory have
been around since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and therefore are not 'modem."' Id. at
1482-1485.
46. See, eg., J. ANGELL & S. AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 36 (3d ed. 1846); H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
HAVING CAPITAL STOCK § 448 (1884).

47. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
48. The sovereign's role in contract relations has been discussed exhaustively elsewhere. See,
e.g., M. COHEN, PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASES OF CONTRACT LAW AND THE

SOCIAL ORDER 41, 69, 102 (1938); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961); H. KELSEN,
PURE THEORY OF LAW §§ 36-40 (1967); Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:.A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 438 (1989); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Ratner, Corporationsand the Constitution, 15 U.S.F.
L. REV. 11, 21, 27 (1980-81).
49. See, e.g., French, The Corporationas Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 208 (1979). Roman law defined "person" as the individual subsistence of a rational nature. This definition supports
the fictional theory of corporate personality. See F. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY xiii (1930).
50. See Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
51. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972).
52. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 47 (1970).
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by the governing body of a state.53
The basic distrust of the corporate form resulted in a system under which any
entity desiring to do business in corporate form had to make an individualized
application to the sovereign.
Prior to general corporation laws, the state granted corporate charters on
an individual basis.5 4 The corporation, then, was based on a contract between
the entrepreneurial participants and the sovereign. It might fairly be said that
the individual chartering approach challenged the American ideal of individualism. Because corporate charters depended upon special acts of the legislature,
the corporate form was not equally available to all. This inequity changed with
the enactment of general corporation acts. These statutes rendered the corporate form available to anyone who complied with the requisite formalities. With
'the increasing number of applications for corporate charters, the states adopted
an assembly-line approach under which a corporate charter need only comply
with the template provided in the corporation law, rather than be individually
crafted.
The advent of generalized corporate laws did not alleviate the distrust of
corporations. As evidence of this distrust, many corporate laws limited the size
of corporations. 55 As explained by Justice Brandeis:
[T]here was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large
aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations. So, at
first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the
grant seemed necessary in order to procure for the community some
specific benefit otherwise unattainable. The later enactment of general
incorporation laws does not signify that the apprehension of corporate
domination had been overcome. The desire for business expansion created an irresistible demand for more charters; and it was believed that
under general laws embodying safeguards of universal application the
scandals and favoritism incidental to special incorporation could be
avoided. The general laws which long embodied severe restrictions
upon size and the scope of corporate activity, were, in part, an expres56
sion of the desire for equality of opportunity.
Until the early twentieth century, most corporate statutes did not give corporations the power to merge with one another; a special act of the legislature was
53. S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2 (2d ed.

1908).
54. See, eg., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 8a (rev. ed. 1946) ("Formerly, when a corporation was to be organized a private bill had to be introduced in the legislature, referred to a committee, passed through both houses and signed by the governor of the state."); C. ELLIOTr, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 20 (3d ed. 1900); R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE

LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 20 (1936); Bratton, supra note 45.
55. Restrictions included limitations on the amount of capital as well as limitations upon the
scope of a business corporation's powers and activities. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
549-557 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brandeis, "The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size and powers of business corporations appears to
have been due, not to their conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself,
but to the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them." Id. at 557 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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required for corporations to merge.57 The limitations on the size of corporations, including the absence of a general authorization for corporate mergers,
was based on distrust of big business. Limitations on corporate size exemplify
the rich historical tradition of corporate law as public law.58 Some observers
claim that the demise of the ultra vires doctrine59 in corporate law reflected a
°
decreasing public focus and concomitant privatization of corporate law. Corporate charters traditionally state the corporate purpose. Any activity that does
not further the corporate purpose as articulated in the charter is said to be ultra
vires. The decline of the ultra vires doctrine during the twentieth century has
been seen as a recognition of the entity theory of corporateness. 6 1 The decreasing significance of ultra vires in corporate law also can be viewed as simply a
realization that there is no reason for the state to limit corporate purposes, but in
other respects the public regulatory aspect of corporate law remains. 62
C.

Is ManagerialIndependence Enough?

As noted earlier, the primary attack on the fiduciary paradigm is that it
interferes with efficient capital growth. The economic assault, however, has not
been the only basis of attack upon the fiduciary paradigm. Another approach
challenges the fiduciary model as unrealistic. 6 3 Some commentators suggest

that the courts have replaced the fiduciary norm with a duty of independence.64
Professor Cox has amply demonstrated that the claim that a director is independent simply because he or she may be disinterested in a particular transaction is highly questionable. 65 Indeed, a substantial body of literature recognizes
57. For example, the New Jersey legislature did not enact its first merger statute of general
application until 1893. Act of Mar. 8, 1893, ch. 67, 1893 NJ. Laws 121. Delaware's first general
merger statute appeared in 1899. Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 54, 21 Del. Laws 445, 461. Other
states were much later. Eg., Act of Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 77, § 1, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 81. Wisconsin
did not permit mergers until 1947. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877
F.2d 496, 506 (7th Cir. 1989). Although not embodied in the state corporate laws, in 1890 the
Sherman Antitrust Act established prohibitions against monopolization and contracts in restraint of
trade. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
58. See, eg., J. HURST, supra note 52, at 98.
59. The advent of the implied powers doctrine and all-purpose clauses in corporate charters has
combined with the elimination of the ultra vires defense by the corporation to actions by third parties. See, eg., H. HENN & G. ALEXANDER, supra note 28.
60. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 50.
61. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV.
173, 221 (1985) ("[T]he demise both of the ultra vires doctrine as well as of constitutional restrictions on foreign corporations was an expression of the triumph of the natural entity theory.").
62. Consider, for example, the statutory restrictions on dividends and other corporate distributions. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 173 (1983).
The entire system of legal capital was constructed not to protect the primacy of shareholders
but rather to protect outsiders, namely creditors. In protecting creditors, the law also necessarily
protected the interests of employees in maintaining a going concern. While the Revised Model Business Coirporation Act has eliminated the capital system, it nevertheless puts constraints on corporate
distributions. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6.40 (1984).
63. See Haft, Business DecisionsBy the New Board: BehavioralScience and CorporateLaw, 80
MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1981) (suggesting that boards of directors can benefit from a behavioralist analysis
of decision making).
64. E!g., Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model A Director'sDuty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1351, 1444 (1989).
65. Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundationsand Legal Implica-
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the inherent structural bias of directors. 66 The evidence of structural bias may

simply be another way of recognizing that managers and shareholders have di-

vergent interests. 67 Thus, it is doubtful that a requirement of independence can
give adequate protection to corporate interests other than those of its
68
managers.
IV.

4.

CoRPoRATIoN AS CoNTRAcr

The ContractarianModel-A Synopsis

The current fashion among economists is to eschew the fiduciary model of
corporate structure in favor of a contractarian approach. 69 One aspect of the

contractarian view is that the law should impose the minimum amount of interference on freedom of contract. 70 More accurately, the contract model of corporate existence is derived from a basic value judgment that, in general,
goverimental interference and protectionism should yield to freedom of contract. According to Professor Eisenberg, 7 1 the contract model fails, at least in
the case of a publicly held corporation, because shareholder consent is an illutions of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1985); Cox, Heroes in the
Law: Alford v. Shaw, 66 N.C.L. REv. 565, 580 (1988) (suggesting that a court is better suited than
an independent committee of directors to determine whether continuation of a derivative suit is in
the best interests of the corporation); Cox, Compensation,Deterrenceand the Market asBoundaries

for DerivativeSuit Procedures,52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 745, 783-88 (1984) (discussing the derivative
suit as a means of achieving deterrence of management misconduct and compensation for such misconduct to the injured parties in cases involving either violations of the duty of loyalty or the duty of
care); Cox, Searchingfor the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata
and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962 (arguing that a reviewing court should carefully
scrutinize a special litigation committee's assertion of independence and recommendation, making
its own evaluation of whether a derivative suit is in the corporation's best interest).
66. See authorities cited supra note 65.
67. Cf Coffee, Shareholders Versus Manager The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L.
REv. 1, 9 (1986) ("Economic theory suggests that shareholders and managers have struck an implicit contract.").
68. Professor Palmiter suggests the following relevance of a duty of independence:
What then does a duty of independence do? It provides standards for judicial review
of corporate decision making in contexts in which neither abstention nor full-blown intervention is warranted. It operates when interest is inferable or even clear but at the same
time countervailing shareholders' interests argue for judicial caution. It operates when the
premises of the fiduciary model suggest that directors should be capacitated as monitors,
and it provides the best means of juggling the underlying tensions of the mixed-motive
cases. The evolving standards in the takeover and special litigation cases make this clear:
they are neither care nor loyalty standards-they are standards of independence. It is time
to abandon the business judgment and fairness rhetoric and to focus critical attention on
the contractarian, efficiency, and prudential premises of the fiduciary model. A duty of
independence bridges the gap in these areas between the academic literature and the case
law.
Palmiter, supra note 64, at 1462.
69. See generally Bebchuk, ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(1989) (discussing opting out of the rules of corporate law by adopting charter amendments).
70. It is possible to reach a noninterventionist conclusion from other perspectives as well. See,
e.g., Barach & Elstrott, The TransactionalEthic: The EthicalFoundationsof Free EnterpriseReconsidered, 7 J. Bus. Em ics 545 (1988) (One of the primary reasons that free enterprise works is the
transactional ethic. Mutually beneficial interests, which both require and promote the Golden Rule,
must be a goal of free enterprise with minimal outside intervention.).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 155-66.
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sory concept. Consent is an essential element of classical contract doctrine 72

and thus the absence of consent is fatal to a contractarian analysis.
The latest version of the contract theory of corporate existence, which had
its genesis in 1937, 73 takes the position that the corporate structure consists of a
nexus of contracts, leaving the various constituents free to negotiate their own
terms. 74 Thus, the fiduciary model imposes restraints on that freedom of contract insofar as it limits the extent to which managers can favor their own interests over those of the shareholders. The contractarians suggest that by
permitting managers and shareholders to define their relative rights and obligations, a more efficient firm will emerge than would be the case where managers'

decisions are guided by a predetermined set of fiduciary obligations. Increased
72. See, eg., P. ATi!AH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 408 (1979).
73. In 1937, Coase published his article The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937),
which described the firm as an organized way of minimizing the transactions costs of contracting
and pricing. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972), is frequently credited as the origin of the contractarian view of the
corporation. See Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 767, 770-77 (1989). The corporation, however, has long been recognized as a nexus of con-

tracts. See infra note 141.
One commentator aptly observed that many of the component notions of the new economic

theory have been with us since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Bratton, supra note 45,
at 408 n.3.
74. As explained by one commentator:
In this model, the firm is a "nexus of contracts" or a market place where the various
constituencies contract for their own protection. The entrepreneurial concept of the firm is

rejected. Ownership of the firm disappearsas a meaningful concept under this model because no one can own a "nexus." Shareholders are merely parties to one contract that
comprises the firm. Moreover, control of the firm is shared among various constituencies.
Control is reflected in the terms of various contracts entered into by individuals. According to this model, it makes little sense to focus upon shareholders' "ownership" and control
when various constituencies share control. It also makes little sense to speak of "corporate" social responsibility because the firm is only a "nexus." Various constituencies can
obtain the protection they need by bargaining for contract terms.
Dallas, Two Models of CorporateGovernance: Beyond Berle & Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 19, 23
(1989) (emphasis added).
Other commentators also addressed the nexus of contracts model and other aspects of firm
ownership and control. See eg., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 73; Demsetz, The Structure of
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close
Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. Rnv. 271 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Easterorook & Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and ResidualClaims, 26 J.L. & EON. 327 (1983); Fama &
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EON. 301 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the DerivativeSuit in CorporateLaw: A Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnalysis,71 CORNELL
L. Rnv. 261 (1986); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims:
The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 367 (1983); Klein, The Modern Business
Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints,91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J, LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For discussion
of the transaction cost approach, see 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1975); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984); Williamson, The
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 548 (1981); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins,Evolution, Attributes, 19 . EON. LIT. 1537 (1981); Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EON. 233
(1979).
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efficiency in turn increases the potential for shareholder wealth maximization-a
goal generally recognized as paramount in corporate existence. Although

wealth maximization clearly is the proper goal of business corporations, it does
not necessarily follow that government regulation that imposes limits on that

goal is inappropriate. Moreover, although it is appropriate to view the corporation as a series of contracts, this paradigm does not provide an answer to all
questions concerning the proper scope of governmental
corporations.

regulation

of

B. Drawing the Distinction between Mandatory and Permissive Norms

The essence of the contractarian view is that corporate law is (and should
be) enabling and should not impose mandatory strictures on activity. The observation that state corporate laws are largely enabling is not new.75 The fact that
corporate laws permit the participants great flexibility to define their relative

rights and duties by contract (le., in corporate charter provisions) does not
mean, however, that mandatory rules (at least at the margin) are unwarranted.

Recognizing this point, Professor John Coffee rejects a pure contractarian
notion; 76 nevertheless, he borrows from contract analysis. Coffee distinguishes
between concepts of fiduciary duty and the contract notion of good faith.7 7 He

views fiduciary duty and good faith as part of a continuum. Good faith defines
the floor for contractual dealings generally, whereas fiduciary duty sets higher

standards applicable in certain relationships. 78 Professor Coffee maintains that
the contract law principle that a party cannot by contract eliminate his or her
obligation of good faith7 9 should apply in the corporate context.8 0 Coffee would
75. Eg., Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?,50 CORNELL L.Q.
599 (1965).
76. Coffee, Balance, supra note 39, at 1620-22; Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory ofthe Corporation,and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919, 932 (1988).
Professor Coffee takes the position that the contractarian hypothetical bargaining model actually
undermines contract formation. Because courts will fill the gaps in arrangements in order to maxi-

mize wealth (Le., by adding what a reasonable person would bargain for), the contractarian model
discourages actual bargaining. Also, the contract approach allows departures from the norm with.
out taking into account the distribution of gains.
77. See supranote 76; see also De Mott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis ofFiduciaryObligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879.
78. Coffee, Balance, supra note 39, at 1653-64.
79. Eg., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); id. § 1-102(3) ("The effect of provisions of this
Act may be varied by agreement... except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement, but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1138 (3d ed. 1987); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 570 (1960 & Supp 1990); Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 371 (1980). For an
early formulation of this view, see Industrial & Gen. Trust Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N.Y. 215, 225-26, 73
N.E. 7, 9-10 (1905); cf VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (holding that the parties could expressly consent in the contract to particular conduct that
would have been barred by the duty of good faith).
80. Coffee, Balance, supra note 39, at 1653-64.
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establish traditional fiduciary duties as the default provision in the corporate
contract and would permit the parties to opt out.81 This renegotiation, he maintains, would result in a redistribution of gain and thus place the burden on corporate managers to adequately compensate the shareholders for any relaxation
of the fiduciary standard.8 2 Under Professor Coffee's model, shareholders could
agree by contract (Le., by amendment of the corporate charter) to limit or eliminate the directors' duty of care.8 3 On the other hand, Coffee would not permit a
charter provision that would allow the managers to trade on inside information
(or otherwise steal from the company). Such a provision would represent an
attempt to contract away the duty of good faith.8 4 A corollary to Professor
Coffee's position is that it may be appropriate for courts to change the default
rules over time, but only to expand fiduciary obligations in favor of shareholder
interests. Expansion of the duties would not unduly inhibit management, which
85
would still be free to propose an opt-out.
C. Corporation as Contract-Some Recent Developments in the Law
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 86 the Delaware
Supreme Court marked a victory for the shareholder supremacy model. The
essence of the shareholder supremacy paradigm is that when managers' interests
conflict with those of the shareholders, managers must yield to the shareholders.
Revlon can also be viewed as at least a partial victory for free market economists.
The court in Revlon ruled that once a company is for sale, the directors are not
free to consider interests relevant to members of the corporate constituency
other than the shareholders. Thus, for example, the workers, consumers, and
long-term health of the business are not proper factors for management to con81. Id. at 1659.
82. This is where Professor Eisenberg's criticism comes into play. To the extent that the shareholder voting process is flawed, it is not meaningful to talk in terms of bargained-for contract terms.
Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1480 (1989). Coffee, how-

ever, borrows from recent contract theory in arguing that shareholder consent can be meaningful.
Coffee concedes that management has an advantage over shareholders in the bargaining process, but
he proffers an information forcing standard as the solution. Coffee, Balance, supra note 39, at 1623,
1679-80; cf Ayres & Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contract An Economic Theory ofDefault
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-107 (1989) (calling for penalty default rules to diminish management's
advantages over shareholders in the bargaining process). According to Coffee, management always
has inside information and, of course, management controls the proxy process. Thus, managers
would be forced to provide adequate information.
83. This, of course, is permitted by the law of many states that have followed the lead of Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988); see eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)
(West 1977 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-2-02(b)(3), 55-8-30(e) (1990).
For a criticism of this approach, see Hazen, The Second Lap, supra note 36, at 179-82.
84. Professor Coffee proposes that the default rule be a high fiduciary standard. He would
permit transaction-specific opt-outs (eg., a charter provision that would prohibit mergers for a fiveyear period), but would not permit a blanket clause (eg., "managers are free to trade on inside
information") because the latter would violate the duty of good faith. But see Eisenberg, supra note
82, at 1474-80 (concerning the ineffectiveness of shareholder consent as a safeguard in opt-out cases).
85. Coffee, Balance, supra note 39, at 1681.
86. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); see Johnson, supra note 23 (recognizing the two conflicting strains in corporate law: management discretion
versus shareholder autonomy); Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Marketfor Corporate Control and
the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 102 (1989).
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sider.8 7 To the extent that the market is an efficient and effective arbiter of
value, it seems reasonable to require the directors to conduct an auction for the
company rather than determine the successful control acquirer according to the
values (and perhaps self interest) of incumbent management. However, others
might argue that Revlon represents an interference with the free market to the
extent that it interferes with the "contract" between the directors and shareholders that otherwise would permit the directors to use their judgment in deciding
to fend off an unwanted offer.
Revlon followed on the heels of the Delaware Supreme Court's earlier decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,88 which set the stage for the auction rule,
although imposing liability for breach of a fiduciary duty. In Van Gorkom the
court held that, in recommending a sale to a third party, the disinterested directors failed to meet their standard of care by, among other things, neglecting to
adequately test the market as to the maximum price that would be attainable for
their shareholders. These two decisions were based on economic rather than
traditional fiduciary considerations. The traditional fiduciary paradigm would
have permitted the directors to exercise their judgment in evaluating the offer.
Potential conflicts of interest would have been accounted for by placing on the
directors the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. The Van Gorkom
opinion hinted and the Revlon decision expressly held that maximization of
shareholder wealth is the only consideration when a corporation is for sale.
State lawmakers throughout the country reacted strongly to these two decisions. First, many states, desiring to limit the effect of Van Gorkom, enacted
charter opt out provisions that enabled directors to limit or eliminate entirely
their liability for duty of care violations.8 9 Such an approach constitutes legislative acceptance of the contractarian model and in the process gives short shrift
to the fiduciary paradigm.90
Not all legislative responses, however, are consistent with the contract
model of the corporation. Other state legislatures responded to the Van Gorkom
87. Note, however, the following statutes all of which expressly permit directors to consider
such factors: IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Bums Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A
§ 716 (Supp. 1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. 1721 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
88. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
89. These statutes were modelled on the Delaware statute enacted in response to the Van
Gorkom decision. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B,
§ 13(b)(1.5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990). For discussion of
the recent duty of care developments and legislative responses, see Bradley & Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of CareStandardin CorporateGovernance, 75 IoWA L. REv. 1 (1989); Hazen, The
Second Lap, supra note 36.

It is significant that not all recent state legislation favors a contractarian approach. Quite to the
contrary, many states have enacted antitakeover legislation that is designed to favor management.
As explained by Judge Easterbrook:
We have not been elected custodians of investors' wealth. States need not treat investors' welfare as their summum bonum. Perhaps they choose to protect managers' welfare
instead, or believe that the current economic literature reaches an incorrect conclusion and
that despite appearances takeovers injure investors in the long run. Unless a federal statute
or the Constitution bars the way, Wisconsin's choice must be respected.
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1989).
90. See Hazen, The Second Lap, supra note 36, at 179-82.
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decision by enacting statutes that expanded the basis for corporate decision-

making. 9 1 Under these laws, corporate directors are permitted (although not
mandated) in making their decisions to take into account members of the corporate community other than the shareholders. For example, in deciding whether
to support a proposed buyout, managers may consider interests of the employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, or even the economy of the state and
nation and "community and societal considerations."'92 The primary motive underlying these statutes has been the legislatures' concern for preserving jobs

within their state. 93 Regardless of the motivation for such statutes, this legislative response evinces a reinforcement of the fiduciary paradigm as opposed to
the contractarian approach taken by other states. Of course, many economists

and other observers will argue that this type of legislative response simply adds
another factor to the contractarian model. Corporations are still free to select

their state of incorporation, and this selection becomes simply another clause to
be negotiated in the corporate contract, 9 4 so long as there are states that have
not similarly modified their corporate law.

A parallel legislative development was the proliferation of various antitakeover statutes. 95 One variety of these antitakeover statutes (commonly known as
"control share statutes") requires a vote by disinterested shareholders before a

new shareholder with substantial share ownership can have voting rights. 96 Another variety is the so-called "best price" approach, which prohibits two-tiered
offers in the absence of a shareholder vote by requiring that an offeror pay a
tender offer or merger price as high as any price it has paid for shares in the

past.97 A more recent variety is the "business combination" statute, which provides for a waiting period between an acquisition of shares and a subsequent
merger into the acquiring company. 9 8 These anti-takeover statutes represent
91. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 716 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1721 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
92. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1989).
93. See, e.g., Hazen, The Second Lap, supra note 36, at 176-77; Hazen, State Anti-Takeover
Legislation: The Second and Third Generations,23 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 77, 108-09 (1988) [hereinafter Hazen, State Legislation]; Romano, The State CompetitionDebate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
94. See, e.g., Butler, Corporation-SpecificAnti-Takeover Statutes and the Marketfor Corporate
Charters,1988 Wis. L. REv. 365, 372-73; see also Baysinger & Butler, The Role ofCorporate Law in
the Theory of the Firm, 28 LL.& ECON. 179 (1985) (arguing that whether a state has permissive
corporate laws plays a factor in determining which fi-rms tend to locate there); Comment, Law for
Sale.: A Study ofthe DelawareCorporationLaw of1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969) (characterizing the Delaware Corporation law as a commodity sold on the open market).
95. See, eg., Hazen, State Legislation, supra note 93, at 78-88.
96. Eg., IND. Bus. CORP. LAW § 23-1-17-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1986). The United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
97. Eg., MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE §§ 3-602, 3-603 (1989) (defining best price to include the
price paid during the past two years); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79 (1987) (best price not defined). In addition to its best-price requirement, the Hawaii statute requires that a bidder offer to
purchase all of the target company's shares. HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976).
98. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 912 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1989). The decisions to date have upheld the
constitutionality of these statutes. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (Wisconsin statute); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del.
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further evidence of legislative aversion to a free market approach in terms of an
unregulated market for corporate control. In fact, a contractarian attack has
been made on such statutes, claiming that they interfere with the contract rights
of the corporate participants and therefore violate the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contract obligations.99

Some of the legislative responses to Van Gorkom and most of the responses
to takeovers illustrate a well-intentioned (but perhaps misplaced) legislative concern for the corporate community beyond simply shareholder or management
supremacy. As such, these responses support a fiduciary paradigm rather than a
contract paradigm of corporate governance. Of course, the charter opt-out provisions, discussed earlier, represent a contrary movement in the legislatures
away from fiduciary principles in favor of the contract model. One explanation
for legislatures' apparent inconsistency is that they are influenced in part by
special interest groups lobbying for corporate management and by the law firms
that represent management. There can be little doubt that this is at least a partial explanation. A further explanation might be that, as a general proposition,
legislatures believe that although the fiduciary paradigm is the appropriate one,
at times it may be necessary to impose limitations on these fiduciary principles.
Thus, many states have found it desirable to have limited director liability for
fiduciary duty breaches as a pragmatic solution-for example, to attract good
outside managers. 10° Furthermore, the charter opt-out provisions are not a

wholesale rejection of the fiduciary paradigm. These provisions limit monetary
liability for duty of care violations, yet they both retain the availability of injunctive relief and disallow the contracting out of duty of loyalty violations. 101
A recent twist in the development of Delaware corporation law occurred
with the watershed decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.102 The Time decision demonstrates a return to the fiduciary model
notwithstanding the Delaware legislature's previous move toward a contractarian model.103 The Time decision is also significant in that the Delaware
court retrenched from the shareholder supremacy model that it earlier had
adopted in Revlon.
The Time litigation arose out of Time, Inc.'s response to a hostile bid by
Paramount. Warner Communications had approached Time, Inc. with a
1988) (Delaware statute); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D.
Del. 1988) (same); City Capital Ass'n v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aff'd, 860 F.2d
60 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).
99. See Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV.
767 (1989); see also Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, ManagerialEntrenchment,and
the ContractualTheory of the Corporation,71 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1985); Ribstein, Takeover Defenses
and the CorporateContract,78 GEo. L.J. 71 (1989); cf Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate
Control, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1365 (1989) (arguing in favor of using the antitrust laws to maintain
competition in the market for corporate control).
100. This is the articulated rationale for charter opt-out statutes. See, eg., Hazen, The Second
Lap, supra note 36.
101. See, eg., the statutes cited supra notes 32-36.
102. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), aff'g [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514
(Del. Ch. 1989).
103. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
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merger proposal. Paramount intervened by offering $175, and eventually offered
$200 per share for the Time stock-a price far in excess of the estimated value of
the proposed Warner/Time merger share exchange. Under Revlon, 1° 4 Time
management might have appeared bound to accept the Paramount offer or, alternatively, to seek a higher offer. Time responded, however, by making a cash
offer for Warner. Because Time had decided to remain independent (albeit a
completely different company after the Warner acquisition), it was free to embark on the acquisition even though in the process, shareholder wealth maximization was sacrificed.105 How could management justify the Warner
acquisition when it resulted in a company valued approximately thirty percent
below the $200 per share price offered by Paramount? One rationale (arguably
consistent with the shareholder primacy model) is that, considering the long
term, Time shareholders would fare better by holding on to their Time/Warner
stock than by selling their shares to Paramount.10 6 The chancery court relied
on Time management's right to focus on the long-term interests of the company
in upholding their decision to reject Paramount's offer.10 7 On appeal, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court declared that the lower court had been "unwise"
in placing "undue emphasis upon long-term versus short-term corporate strategy." 10 8 The court explained:
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law imposes on the board of directors the duty to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation. Del. C. § 141(a). This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus, the
question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances defined under Revlon, a board of directors while always required to act in
an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover. In
our view, the pivotal question presented by this case is: "Did Time, by
entering into the proposed merger with Warner, put itself up for
1 09
sale?"
104. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
105. Once it became apparent that the Time-Warner deal was likely to succeed, the Time stock
dropped, trading a little above $140 per share. This amounted to a price 30% below the price that
the Time shareholders would have realized under the Paramount offer. As this Article went to
press, less than one and a half years after Paramount's offer, Time-Warner, Inc. stock was trading in
the $70 range.
106. The rationale was thus that the short-term profits should take a second chair to the long
term. However, it is clear from the perspective of the Time shareholders' short-term investment
objectives that the Paramount offer was in their best interest.
107. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989).
108. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
109. Id. The court went on to remark in a footnote: "[W]e endorse the Chancellor's conclusion
that it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock market price of shares
is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock. We have so held in another context." Id. at 1150 n.12 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985)).
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Only if the corporation is "for sale" does the Revlon duty not to interfere come
into play. On the other hand, if the corporation is not "for sale," then managers
may invoke the business judgment rule to fend off a hostile bidder according to
the test laid down in the court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
0 Under the Unocal test, directors may employ defensive measures if they
Co. 11
can prove that: (1) there was a reasonable basis for perceiving a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and (2) the defensive measures adopted were reasonable in relation to the perceived threat."'
The threat posed by the Paramount offer, as articulated by Time management, was that it would have meant an end to the existing Time entity and
"corporate culture" of that entity. The directors maintained that the Paramount offer and the business combination that would have followed were not
necessarily best for other Time, Inc. constituencies such as its employees and
consumers. The Delaware courts agreed with Time management's right to determine the company's future. In the course of its decision, the Delaware chancery court emphasized the fact that after the Time-Warner combination, the new
entity would preserve Time's corporate culture. The Warner acquisition properly was viewed as a publishing company's desire to expand its presence in the
entertainment industry." 2 The chancery court thus viewed the Time-Warner
combination as consistent with Time's long-term plans whereas the acquisition
of Time by Paramount would have meant an end to Time. 113 As noted
above,' 14 the Delaware Supreme Court did not agree with the Chancellor's emphasis on long-term rather than short-term goals. The court nevertheless upheld
the decision because otherwise the court would be "substituting its judgment for
what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors."' 15
The Time decision can be seen as a rejection of an efficiency model in favor
of other values. Focusing on market efficiency and shareholder wealth maximization arguably would have led the court to block the Time-Warner combination, or at least give the Time shareholders a choice in the matter. Once the
Warner deal was announced the market reacted unfavorably. The market reacted to Time's announced merger with Warner by pricing the Time stock significantly below the level of Paramount's offer. Efficiency is supposed to
maximize wealth without regard to distributive issues. Under an efficiency
model, the higher price that would have been realized under the Paramount
offer should have gone to the Time shareholders. By entering into the Warner
110. 493 A.2d 946 (1985); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 599 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35

(Del. 1988).
111. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court in Time reaffirmed this test and explained that the
directors satisfy the first prong of the Unocal test by "demonstrating good faith and reasonable
investigation." Time, 571 A.2d at 1152; see also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. 5 95,303 (Del. S.Ct. 1990) (applying Unocal test and upholding negotiated second
tender offer from bidder after unsuccessful search for a white knight).
112. Previously, Time had entered the entertainment industry as evidenced by its earlier acquisition of HBO cable television.
113. It might be argued, however, that the effect on Time of acquiring Warner meant that the
new Time was substantially different from the old.
114. See supra text accompanying note 108.
115. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
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deal, however, the Time management deprived its shareholders of this opportunity. One could easily have imagined the Delaware court saying that Time management's interference with the Paramount offer violated the principles that had
been laid down in Revlon. Nevertheless, the Delaware Court of Chancery was
willing to place a value on management's ability to exercise what arguably was
believed to have been its fiduciary obligation to watch out for all corporate interests, not just those of the Time shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court,
while not endorsing those sentiments, nonetheless was willing to defer to the
judgment of Time management.
Perhaps the fiduciary model is not the best explanation for the Time decision. The power model provides an alternative explanation for the decision.
The Delaware courts have historically upheld the rights of management over the
interests of shareholders.' 16 When viewed in this light, Revlon, which held that
management must favor the interests of the shareholders when their corporation
is for sale, limits management's otherwise dominant position in the power
model. In contrast, Time favors management in the power struggle for control
of the corporation by letting management retain its control at the cost of a
higher exit price for the shareholders. This more cynical view of the decision is
bolstered by the supreme court's action in simply deferring to the judgment of
Time management, which certainly stood to gain by fending off the Paramount
offer and thereby retaining their managerial positions. Regardless of the rationale one may choose to explain the Time result, clearly it cannot be based on
economic efficiency.
V.
A.

SOME FALLACIES UNDERLYING STRICT CONTRACTARIANISM

The CorporateContract and FiduciaryDuties are Not Incompatible

The generalized corporation acts' 1 7 did not change the fact that the corporate charter is a contract between various constituents of the corporation and the
state. When corporate existence is recognized by the Secretary of State's acceptance of the articles of incorporation for filing' 18 (or, alternatively, by the issuance of a certificate of authority' 19), the contract is formed. Not only is there an
inter se contract between and among all of the corporate constituents, the corporate charter also represents a contract with the state. Although it may be an
anathema to say this in certain circles of academic economists, the state's interest in the corporate contract requires us to view the corporation in its political
and social context. As pointed out earlier, although profit maximization is a
proper corporate'goal, it is necessary to factor in the social and political costs
120
rather than let the balance sheet be determined solely by dollars and cents.
116. See, eg., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.

663 (1974); Comment, supra note 94.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
118. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 200 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106
(1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 1990).
119. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 2.15 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
120. See, ag., Camenisch, Profit" Some Moral Reflections, 6 J. Bus. ETHics 225 (1987) (Profit is
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As explained
in an excellent article by Professors Kaen, Kaufman, and
12 1
Zacharias:
The intellectual roots of financial agency theory are most likely to
be found in the classic American liberal as opposed to civic republican
tradition. The liberal tradition emphasizes the instrumentalism of
property and property rights for achieving democratic ends rather than
the equitable distribution of property for development purposes. This
tradition also believes that individuals act in their own self interest and
seeks, therefore, to organize economic activity and institutions so as to
use this self interest in the pursuit of economic efficiency.
It is in this liberal tradition that a justification for arguing that
managers should be held accountable to shareholders can be found.
Without this-or some other-normative value context there simply is
no compelling political reason to be the least bit concerned with efficiency. Efficiency is a means; it is not a value and social/political debates are about values.
This distinction between efficiency as a means and efficiency as a
value is unlikely to cause problems for a positivist economist who is
primarily interested in explaining how things work. However, as soon
as the word "management" is appended to "financial," the luxury of
claiming that one is working in a value free context is no longer available. Even more suspect is any claim that managers' responsibilities
are limited to purely matters of economic efficiency. This question is a
122
political question and is to be debated in a political arena.
Acceptance of a contractarian model thus does not necessarily result in the
elimination of fiduciary duties. The one form of doing business that has always
been recognized as contractual is a partnership. Unlike the corporate form, the
partnership form of doing business does not depend upon statutory authority; 123
instead, partnerships are governed by the law of agency and the law of contracts. 124 It is axiomatic that in the partnership relationship the partners owe
each other the highest of fiduciary duties. 125 This point is illustrated by Judge
Cardozo's famous pronouncement:
Joint adventurers like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stannot the central focus of business ethics. When we focus on profits, we are "raising the question of the
moral legitimacy of the business system itself. That is quite a different enterprise."); Kaen, Kaufman
& Zacharias, American Political Values and Agency Theory: A Perspective, 7 J.Bus. ETHics 805

(1988) (as explained in the abstract: "Historically, economic efficiency was not a value or end in
itself but merely a means by which more fundamental social goals might be achieved.").

121. Kaen, Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 120.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id at 818.
See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP (1988).
Id
See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 123, § 607.
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dard of behavior. 126
The rule thus has developed that although partners are free to define their relative rights and duties by contract, they nevertheless remain subject to high fiduciary standards. 127 This is the rule imposed by the common law, without any
enabling statute. The corporate form takes the argument one step further.
There is no such thing as a common-law corporation. Corporate existence depends wholly upon compliance with applicable corporate enabling laws. The
state, as a precondition to corporate existence, is free to interfere in the entrepreneurs' contractual relationship. The fiduciary obligation of corporate
managers
128
has long been one of these requirements imposed by the state.
The analogy to partnership law is strongly embedded in the law of closely
held corporations. The courts and the commentators long have recognized the
importance of permitting participants in close corporations to stray from certain
statutory norms of corporate existence. 129 For example, courts frequently tolerate the absence of corporate formality more readily in the close corporation set1 30
ting than a strict reading of the corporate law might seem to permit.
Similarly, courts will enforce shareholder agreements 131 and permit limitations
on director authority and discretion in the closely held corporation setting that
they would not accept in a comparable public corporation. 132 Again, as with a
general partnership, the trade-off for permitting more leeway in contract is the
imposition of higher fiduciary obligations. 13 3 Contractarians would impose the
same freedom of contract in the publicly held context without the concomitant
fiduciary duty. This result simply ignores the basis of corporate law in our
tradition.
126. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
127. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 123.
128. See supra notes 27-68 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1986); Cary, How Illinois CorporationsMay Enjoy Partnership
Advantages, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1953); Hornstein, Stockholders'Agreementsin the Closely Held
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950).
130. See, e.g., Galler, 32 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 203 N.E.2d at 586. The courts not only will protect
contractual rights but also "reasonable expectations." See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279,
307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Matter of Kemp & Beatley, 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173 (1984) (finding
"oppressive" conduct by the majority in interfering with the minority's "reasonable expectations");
Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); cf. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264
Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973) (conduct of majority did not rise to the level of "oppression").
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (Supp. 1990); REv.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.31 (1984). But cf Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947) (upholding shareholder vote pooling agreement but refusing to grant specific performance).
132. Eg., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31(b)

(Supp. 1990).
133. See, e.g., Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Cain v. Cain, 3 Mass. App. 467, 334 N.E.2d 650
(1975); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-7-31(b) (Supp. 1990) (providing that if an agreement permits shareholders (or others) to act as
directors, they are held to the same obligations and duties that normally attach to directors).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

B. Freedom of Contract and the Free Market
The contractarian model of the corporation derives from the bargaining
and free market paradigm. This paradigm is used in turn as an excuse for eliminating mandatory rules of fiduciary duty. 134 This view, however, ignores a sig-

nificant fact: the corporate form, by its very nature, represents an interference
with the free market because in a free market consumers can bargain over
whether the owners of an enterprise are held personally liable for the debts of
the enterprise. By taking on the corporate form the owners are clothed with

limited liability. 135 Third parties dealing with a corporation, of course, are free
to enter into contracts with the owners of a business in order to hold them personally accountable; however, this suggestion is not practical except in the case
of certain closely held corporations. 136 The veil of limited liability and separate

entity are real benefits given to the corporation but in exchange for what? Because the corporate franchise has long been viewed as resulting from a contract
1 37
between the members of the corporation and the state that grants the charter,

the state is not only free but perhaps obligated to exact a quid pro quo in return
for the corporate privilege.' 38 By recognizing the corporate franchise, the state

permits interference with the free market in the form of the corporate enterprise.
Applying the contractarians' own bargaining model, where is the consideration?
What is the quid pro quo that society exacts for granting this special privilege to

corporations? As discussed more fully below, 139 an examination of the history

134. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
135. See, eg., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 127 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, § 73; N. LATrIN, LATTIN ON CORI'ORATIONS § I1 (1970).
136. Cf. Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate,58 NEB. L. REV. 627, 631-35 (1979) (discussing the
fact that in start-up closely held enterprises, third parties may not be willing to extend credit without
the personal guarantees of the owners).
137. See, eg., G. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 28 (1877).
A Charter or legislative act of incorporation is usually a mere offer or tender of the corporate privileges contained in it ....
The sovereign authority cannot compel persons to
become a private corporation. They can only become such by their voluntary consent.
In other words:
By accepting a charter the corporators subject themselves to duties which, without their
consent, the state could not have imposed upon them. Accordingly the grant and acceptance of a charter are held to constitute an act whereby the actors have expressed their
intention to occasion legal relations between them; that is to say, a contract has been made
to which the state is a party.
Id. § 449; see also W. CooK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL
STOCK § 492 (7th ed. 1913) (footnotes omitted):
The charter of a corporation having capital stock is a contract between three parties,
and forms the basis of three distinct contracts. The charter is a contract between the state
and the corporation; second, it is a contract between the corporation and the stockholders;
third, it is a contract between the stockholders and the state.
Id.; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, § 78; R. STEVENS, supra note 54, § 7.
138. See, eg., W. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 27 (1897),
It is essential to the existence of a private corporation that there shall be an agreement
between the corporators and the corporation, creating a contractual relation between them
.... There is no contract between individual membcrs in the formation of a corporation.
The contract is between each individual member and the whole body of members in their
collective capacity, represented by the corporation.

Id.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 143-46.
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of corporations suggests that it is reasonable to exact compliance with a public
regulatory structure over corporate conduct as the quid pro quo of the exchange.I4° Stated differently, although the corporation is a nexus of contracts,
the terms of those contracts necessarily incorporate by reference the rules of law
141
imposed by the state in exchange for granting the corporate privilege.
As discussed previously, 14 2 the clearest form of business association that is
based on contract is a partnership, 143 and it is elementary that partners owe to
each other the highest fiduciary obligation. 144 Partnership law, as mentioned

earlier, is comprised of contract and agency principles. Nevertheless, the courts
recognized that a partner's management authority over partnership assets calls
for the imposition of fiduciary responsibilities. Accordingly, it should not be
surprising that correlative obligations exist in the corporate setting.1 45 Courts
have long recognized that the panoply of fiduciary obligations is a necessary
buffer against the power that management could otherwise wield as a result of
their positional advantage in the bargaining process. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court more than half a century ago:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests. While
technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the
years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty, not only to affirmatively protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of
140. See, eg., S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2
(2d ed. 1908) (quoted in the text accompanying supra note 53).
141. See, eg., H. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING
CAPITAL STOCK § 448 (1884):
[Trhe constitution of a corporation, besides being the group of legal rules which manifest
themselves in legal relations in respect of the corporate enterprise, always embodies a contract among the corporators, and sometimes a contract between the corporation and the
state. To say that it embodies a contract between the corporators means that it embodies
the terms of an agreement whereby the parties have expressed their intention of occasional

legal relations which are manifestations of the rules of law composing the very constitution
which embodies the contract.
Id.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.

143. As commentators have observed:
There is an obvious and striking difference between a company established for private
hazard and profit by an act or charter of incorporation, and an ordinary co-partnership.

The latter is simply a voluntary contract, or the result of such a contract, whereby two or

more persons agree to combine their property or labor, or both, for the purpose of a common undertaking.... But this definition greatly falls short of a company established as a

body corporate, which, though originating in a voluntary contract, is the result not only of
that, but of its confirmation by special legislative authority. This confirmation is indispensable to enable the parties to the compact to sue and be sued, as a company, by a general

name, to act by a common seal, and to transmit their property in succession.
J. ANGELL &S. AMES, supra note 46, at 36 (footnotes omitted).

144. Eg., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 27-68.
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profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to
it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its
powers. 146
Thus, more than fifty years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that
the selfish instincts of corporate management must be curbed by fiduciary principles. The contract model fails to safeguard against "economic man's" rational
self-interest when embodied in corporate managers' bargaining with their
shareholders.
Another problem with the contractarian model of corporate conduct is that
it fails to take account of fairness considerations. Contracts entered into from
unequal bargaining positions are neither fair nor rational. 147 Thus, courts, as a
matter of contract law, will police unfair bargains when failure to do so would be
"unconscionable." 148 Economists tend to label arguments based on claims of
fairness as irrational or value laden. Economists evaluate transactions in terms

of efficiency and productive transfers of wealth. 149 Generally, an "unfair" transaction is one in which the distribution of wealth is not as we would have it. As
noted earlier, basing a system of law purely on redistributive justice is not efficient. 150 Some observers have argued that bargains which might be characterized as "unfair" also can be rational since these transactions do not necessarily
result in unproductive transfers of wealth.' 5 l The essence of this economic argument is that efficiency and optimality of transactions do not depend upon who
are the winners and who are the losers. In other words, an economic analysis of
the law might lead to the conclusion that efficiency should be determined without regard to distributive justice. 152 Under this view that efficiency is not concerned with distributive justice, unfair bargains could be upheld so long as they
involve productive transfers. Presumably, it is in this way that those who promote a contractarian view of the corporation are able to ignore the unequal bargaining position of the parties and the fact that under the contractarian model,
146.
147.
follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
D. GAUTHIER, supra note 19. Gauthier's analysis is summarized by Professor Coleman as

Bargaining is rational only if compliance is rational.
Compliance is rational only if the bargain outcome is fair.
Therefore, bargaining is rational only if it is fair.
Therefore, rational bargains must be fair bargains.
Therefore, bargaining from whatever unfair advantages one may have ex ante is not
rational. (The reason: Bargaining from unfair positions yields unfair outcomes with
which it is not rational to comply. But if it is not rational to comply, then it is not
rational to bargain).
J.COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 316; see also Kraus & Coleman, supra note 19 (discussing the rational
choice framework and its relationship to moral theory in light of Gauthier's analysis).
148. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment c
(1979); see infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text. Fairness as a limitation on the enforcement of
contracts is not a new concept. For an interesting discussion of eighteenth century principles of
fairness as a limitation on the enforcement of contracts, see M. HORwlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 161-210 (1977).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
150. See supra text accompanying note 20.
151. J.COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 323.
152. See, eg., R. POSNER, supra note 12.
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managers are able to exert power over the shareholders' assets without having to
pay an adequate quid pro quo.

C. The Failure of the ContractModel to Adequately Understand
ContractLaw
Professors Brudney and Eisenberg take the contractarians to task, insisting

that the fiduciary paradigm is the proper one. 15 3 Their attacks are properly
premised on the incongruity of the contract analogy because of the absence of

meaningful consent of the parties on both sides of the bargain.
As Professor Brudney aptly expressed, in the context of a publicly held
concern, the dispersion and diversity of shareholders makes it anomalous to impute to them the same type of bargaining ability as that held by parties to an
individually negotiated contract. 154 Professor Eisenberg elaborates on this point
by pointing to the inadequacy of the shareholder voting system as a basis for

recognizing shareholder consent.1 55 It is elementary contract law that the enforceability of a contract is dependent upon a finding of freely bargained-for
mutual consent.1 56 Clearly, the relative power positions of the various corporate

constituencies denies them equal bargaining power when dealing with corporate
management. It thus makes little sense to talk in terms of consent with regard
to certain types of contractual arrangements within the corporation.
Professor Eisenberg approaches the inadequacy of shareholder consent
within the confines of three different corporate settings: existing public corporations, corporations about to go public, and closely held companies. 15 7 Eisenberg
153. Brudney, CorporateGovernance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1403, 1407-08 (1985); Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1461
(1989). For other attacks on the contractarian model, see Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure,25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in CorporateLaw: The Desirable Constraintson CharterAmendments, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 1820 (1989); Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial? A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.L.
REV. 542 (1990); Branson, Assault on Another CitadeL"Attempts to Curtailthe FiduciaryStandardof
Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors,57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988); Coffee, Balance, supra
note 39; Cox, Reflections on ex ante Compensation and Diversificationof Risk as FairnessJustificationsfor Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors,and ControllingShareholders, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1987); Millon, supra note 50.
154. As Professor Brudney explained:
[lt is erroneous to use the term "contract" to describe dispersed stockholders' relation to
the "original owner" or to corporate management, if by doing so the user assimilates the
assumptions about parties' volition and cognition in conventionally bargained and closed
buy-sell contracts to the circumstances that attend the connection between purchase or sale
of stock and the long term, open ended "contracts" between management and its
corporation.
Brudney, supra note 153, at 1406 (footnotes omitted). This fact has long been recognized:
"Some writers and some of the cases say that there must be an agreement between the members,

creating a contractual relation between them, but this is inaccurate. There is no contract between
individual members in the formation of a corporation." W. CLAPIK, supra note 138, § 27.
155. Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1474-80. Professor Eisenberg's thesis is a development of his
earlier work on corporate structure. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

§§ 2.2, 3.1 (1982); Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752-54
(1982).
157. "[S]hareholder consent to rules proposed by top managers in publicly held corporations
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contends that in the publicly held corporation, the proxy system is imperfect for
several reasons. He points to four limitations on the legitimacy of shareholder
consent. First, in public corporations, management control of the proxy machinery produces only nominal consent.158 Second, shareholder action is frequently a consent tainted by conflict of interest, based upon an institutional
bias. 159 Eisenberg notes that institutions own approximately half of the shares
in publicly held companies. 16° Even aside from institutional bias, this means
that many individual shareholders will not get a say in the corporation's governance. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission rules provide that
when a shareholder gives his or her proxy to management, unless the shareholder gives specific instructions to the contrary, management may vote the
shares as it sees fit. 16 1 Furthermore, under the New York Stock Exchange rules
governing the voting of shares held in street name, the registered shareholder
(the institutional holder) may vote as it pleases if the beneficial owner (the true
shareholder) has not given instructions within ten days of the request for instructions. 162 Third, Eisenberg points out that frequently the inequality of
power within the corporation results in coerced consent.163 For example, any
management proposal to limit or eliminate the traditional fiduciary duty rules
involves inherent conflicts of interest between the shareholders and directors. It
goes without saying that management will favor its own interests. Fourth, Eisenberg refers to impoverished consent:
For example, shareholders may vote for a rule proposed by management even though they would prefer a different rule, because the proposed rule is better than the rule it replaces and management's control
over the agenda effectively limits the shareholders' choice to the existing rule or the proposed rule. 164
Professor Eisenberg does not take the position that shareholder consent is meaningless. He concludes, however, that in a public corporation, shareholder consent is meaningful only at the margins-that is, to safeguard against clearly
165
detrimental proposals.
Consent is no more meaningful in a firm that is about to go public than it is
in a firm that is already publicly held. Contractarians argue that in initial public
offerings an informed market values the securities in accordance with the terms
of the contract provisions embodied in the corporate charter. Eisenberg takes
may be either nominal, tainted by a conflict of interest, coerced or impoverished." Eisenberg, supra
note 153, at 1474. In the context of a corporation about to go public, it is unlikely 1) that variations
in fiduciary rules would be accurately reflected in the initial offering price, and 2) even if they were,
that investors would be aware of the variations and able to properly evaluate them. Id. at 1515-24.
158. Id. at 1474-76.
159. Id. at 1476-77.
160. Id. at 1476.

161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(l) (1988).
162. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 402.06(B)(b)(I) & (D)
(1983).

163. Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1477; see also Dallas, supra note 74 (constituencies, other than
the shareholders, can gain control by "bargaining").
164. Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1477.
165. Id at 1479-80.
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issue with this proposition by pointing out that, among other things "[i]t is no
more likely that buyers in an initial public offering would know of variations in
core fiduciary and structural rules than that buyers of insurance policies will
166
know the fine print in their policies."
Other commentators have observed the fallacy of the assumption made by
many economic writers that individual actors know legal rules. 167 Professor

Bebchuk makes the point that even if the initial corporate charter properly can
be viewed as purely a private contract, charter amendments cannot because
there is no efficient mechanism for compensating existing shareholders for any

transfers accomplished by the charter amendment. 168
The lack of meaningful consent in many aspects of the manager/shareholder relationship is undeniable. This limitation on the concept of shareholder
consent, in turn, must be viewed as a limitation on the contract model of corporate governance.
D.

The Death of Contract16 9 and the Corporation as Contract

Another deficiency of the contractarian model is its failure to recognize the
trend of contract law during the twentieth century. The contractarians are, of
course, correct in pointing to the impact of economic analysis; 170 however, they
ignore the fact that the rigidity of many contract doctrines has been ameliorated
by developments in the law of promissory estoppel and restitution.
Promissory estoppel is based on reliance rather than a bargained-for exchange. 17 1 Promissory estoppel arises when there is no contractual basis for
enforcing a promise. Frequently the absence of a contract will result from the
lack of consent to a bargain. 172 The essence of promissory estoppel is to recognize the reliance interest when necessary to avoid injustice. 173 Accordingly, the
doctrine gives force to promises that otherwise would be unenforceable "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 174 Although the development and expansion of promissory estoppel has not gone without
166. Id. at 1521.

167. See Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J.

LEGAL STUD. 67, 81-84 (1987).
168. See Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1823, 1825-29.
169. See G. GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
170. Consider, for example, the increasing acceptance of the efficient breach analysis. Eg.,
Linzer, On the Amorality of ContractRemedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). For an excellent critique of the efficient breach
approach to contract remedies, see Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract:Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REv. 947 (1982).

171. See, e.g., Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
172. Often this arises in a case of a gratuitous promise where consideration is lacking. Eg.,
Rickets v. Scothhorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898); East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia,
103 R.I. 597, 239 A.2d 725 (1968); Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel: Principlefrom Precedents(pts. 1,2),
50 MICH. L. REv. 639, 873 (1952).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). A similar formulation appears in
the first Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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criticism, 17 5 the doctrine is firmly embedded as a complement to contract law.

Furthermore, since promissory estoppel's inception, its influence has expanded.
Originally the doctrine of promissory estoppel was thought to be available only

in a limited number of contexts, none of which involved ordinary commercial
dealings. 176 Over time, the clear trend has been to extend promissory estoppel
to the commercial world.' 7 7 For the same reasons that promissory estoppel is
invoked if necessary to avoid injustice when the contract law is inadequate to
protect expectations, fiduciary obligations must be invoked in the corporate context in order to make up for the unfortunate results that would follow from a
purely contractual approach. As one court explained, "promissory estoppel...
is an attempt by the courts to keep remedies abreast of increased moral con178
sciousness of honest and fair representations in all business dealings."'

Another doctrine used to ameliorate the failure of the contract paradigm is
that portion of the law of restitution, alternatively referred to as an action in
quasi contract, contract implied-in-law, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. 179 Similar to promissory estoppel, recovery in restitution is not based on

a bargain or market-based exchange but rather on the necessity of avoiding in-

justice. As explained by one court, "[tihe key words are enrich and unjustly.'180
The law of contracts thus is supplemented by two doctrines-promissory estop-

pel and restitution, both of which are based upon principles of justice. Both
promissory estoppel and restitution are grounded in relational interests and interactions between the parties that go beyond the typical contract bargain, yet

promissory estoppel and restitution are integral parts of current contract law. It
is anomalous to talk about a contract paradigm without considering these supplemental doctrines. Transporting the contract paradigm into the corporate setting, therefore, is not inconsistent with recognition of fiduciary obligations.
175. Eg., G. GILMORE, supra note 169, at 61-72.
176. It was typically said that promissory estoppel was available only in the following situations:
promises within the family, promises to make a gift of land, promises in connection with gratuitous
agencies and bailments, and charitable subscriptions. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 62, at 275-82 (3d ed. 1987); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 156, § 2.19, at 89-98 (1982).
177. E.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); Warder & Lee
Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163
(Mo. App. 1959); East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 239 A.2d 725 (1968).
But see James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (upholding the traditional view
that promissory estoppel is not available in a commercial setting). See generally Knapp, Reliance In
the Revised Restatement- The ProliferationofPromissoryEstoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981)
(revisors of the Restatement recognized expansion of promissory estoppel and acted in accordance
with the trend).
178. People's Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 219 Ark. 11, 17, 240 S.W.2d
12, 16 (1951); see also Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1978) (promissory estoppel will be
used to prevent a party from using a statute to defraud another party).
179. See, eg, D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 4.1, 4.2, at 222-40 (1973); E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 156, § 2.20, at 98-104.
180. Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 105, 109, 219 A.2d 332, 334 (1966);
see also Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Tenn. 45, 50-59, 407 S.W.2d 150, 152-56 (1966) (court remanded for determination of whether the defendant had been unjustly enriched).
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The Problem of Tunnel Vision 181 in Economic Analysis

A basic flaw in the contractarian approach is that it is based on a model of
the corporation purely as an economic institution. It would be absurd, of
course, to try to minimize the significance of the corporation as an economic

institution or to lose sight of the proposition that the driving force behind a
corporation is the profit motive. 182 Not all economists agree, however, that economic modeling requires that profit maximization be the primary goal. 1 83 Furthermore, as illustrated more than fifty years ago in the writings of Berle and

Means, the fact remains that the corporation is also a political and social institu-

tion. 184 The Berle and Means model of corporate governance flows from the
premise that shareholders are in the best position to maximize profits.' 8 5 As
Berle and Means explained:

[A] society in which production is governed by blind economic forces
is being replaced by one in which production is carried on under the

ultimate control of a handful of individuals. The economic power in
the hands of the few persons who control a giant corporation is a tre-

mendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals,
affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one com-

munity and prosperity to another. The organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm of186
private enterprise-they have
institutions.

become more nearly social
The Berle and Means analysis focuses on the struggle for power between shareholders and managers, thereby departing from Professor Dodd's focus on social
87
responsibility. 1
Berle and Means suggested that the wide dispersion of ownership in public
corporations effectively removed control from the shareholders. Berle and

Means feared that corporate managers, no longer restrained by shareholder control, would not be motivated primarily by their duty to make profits for the
181. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv.
451, 452 (1974) ("[Wlhat pressures in contemporary legal scholarship might be responsible for the
appearance, now, of four hundred pages of tunnel vision and, assuming one could answer that, why

this particular tunnel?").
182. Identifying the profit motive as a primary driving force of corporate policy does not answer
the question; it merely reshapes the question. The various models of corporate structure have yet to
grapple with the problems of whether the yardstick is properly calibrated in terms of long-term or
short-term goals.
183. Eg., 3. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 125-27, 166-78 (1967) (arguing that
the stated goal of industrial organizations is profit-maximization is "pure myth"; their actual goal is
survival, autonomy, and economic growth).
184. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 299-302
(rev. ed. 1968).
185. Id.; see also Dant, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989
WIs. L. REv. 881 (concluding that control of proxy voting should be taken away from management
and given to largest shareholders in public corporations); Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the
Concept of the Corporation,64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964) (analyzing the historical debate between
Dodd and Berle and concluding that Berle's thesis is the most desirable).
186. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 184, at 46 (footnote omitted).
187. Professor Dodd believed that corporate managers hold their powers in trust not only for the
shareholders but for members of the corporate constituency, including employees and customers
See Dodd, supra note 28, at 1154-57; Weiner, supra note 185, at 1459-61.
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corporation and thus for the shareholders. 1 88 Other commentators support
rather than decry the separation of ownership from control.18 9 These proponents herald the divorce of ownership from control in public corporations as an
opportunity for more efficient corporate operation. They suggest that the market for corporate control will keep managers efficient, lest the low price of a
poorly or inefficiently managed company render it an attractive takeover candidate.1 90 According to this argument, corporate managers will maximize profits
as a matter of their own preservation.19 1 This paradigm, however, does raise
questions as to balancing the long-term versus short-term interest of the firm and
its investors. As pointed out earlier, short-term maximization of corporate
wealth may be at the expense of workers' jobs and future productivity of the
business.
The Berle and Means view as a paradigm of corporate governance undoubtedly has faded in popularity. Some observers, including the contractarians, have
challenged some of the premises of the Berle and Means analysis. For example,
Berle and Means set forth a trustee paradigm for analyzing behavior of public
corporations that employs microeconomics to explain the behavior of management (rather than shareholder-run) corporations.1 92 More recently, John Ken188. See g.,Hazen & Buckley, Models of Corporate Conduct: From the Government Dominated Corporation to the Corporate Dominated Government, 58 NEB. L. REv. 100, 109 (1978).
Professors Jensen and Mecklng picked up where Berle and Means left off. See Jensen & Meclling,
Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.

305 (1976). As explained by Professor Coffee:
[Tihey recognize the potential conflicts that arise between managers and shareholders once
share ownership becomes dispersed; the utility-maximizing agent, they acknowledge, does
not necessarily have an incentive to act in the best interests of his principal. Accordingly,
the principal will have to incur costs to monitor the agent's performance and will pay less
for shares in the corporation in proportion to the magnitude of the "agency costs" that
must be so incurred. At this point, Jensen and Meckling make their distinctive contribution: It is in the agent's interest, they argue, to convince investors that the firm will have
an institutional structure which will minimize agency costs (a term that includes both the
expenditures incurred to reduce managerial misappropriation and shirking plus the irreducible minimum of such losses).... Following Jensen and Meckling, neoclassical economists have tended to assume that market forces alone will result in the installation of the
optimal level of monitoring devices and incentive systems that bring agency costs down to
an irreducible minimum. At this minimum level, no additional dollar spent on internal
controls or incentive compensation will yield an equivalent reduction in managerial opportunism or shirking.
Coffee, ShareholdersVersus Managers: The Strainin the Corporate Web, 85 MicH.L. REv. 1,25-26

(1986).

189. Eg. Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 26061 (1967).
190. Id. at 265-66.
191. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J.
1521, 1541 (1982); Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers-Does Anything Go?, 53 TENN. L.
REv. 103, 108 (1985).
192. Kaen, Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 120. Two schools of thought emerged: "a theoretical 'managerialist' school and a revealed preference 'behaviorist' school." Id.; see also Cyert &
Hedrick, Theory of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future, An Interpretation, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 398
(1972); Machlup, Theories of the Firm:Marginalist,Behavioral,Managerial,57 AM. ECON. REv. 1,
4-6 (1967); Bommer, Gratto, Gravander & Tuttle, A Behavioral Model of Ethical and Unethical
Decision Making, 6 J.Bus. ETHics 265, 268-73 (1987) (Decision makers' social, government and
legal, work, professional and personal environments are among the factors that influence ethical and
unethical behavior in organizations.).
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neth Galbraith suggested that, left unfettered, corporate managers will not
produce the best results for society.193
One failure of the Berle paradigm and, later, the Galbraith analysis is that
these models do not address the balance of power between managers and shareholders in deciding how best to distribute the corporate profits. 194 Coase took
the position that these decisions were essentially economic in nature. 195 He further explained that business organizations resulted from efforts to lower the
transaction costs of market coordination. 196 Under the Coase theorem, if there
are no transactions costs, then distributional rules are unimportant because efficiency will lead to the proper outcome. 197 It is clear, however, that there are
transaction costs to allocation or reallocation of corporate rights and duties.
Thus, distributive problems are a proper concern even under an economically

rational model. As Professor Coleman explains:
Legal rules are responses to market failings. Within a rational
choice framework (in which economics is ultimately imbedded), ineffi-

ciency creates an opportunity for rational cooperation. Rational cooperation exists in agreement to and compliance with a set of constraints

on individually maximizing strategies. A large number of such constraints, which differ from one another in their distributive dimension,
can in theory produce efficient outcomes. Rational cooperation requires an agreement upon a set of such constraints. Thus, rational co193. J. GALBRArrH, supra note 183, at 95.
194. According to Kaen, Kaufman & Zacharias:
Left unaddressed in both the Galbraith and Berle critique is the question of whether
the reinvestment of corporate earnings represented a new question of whether reinvestment
of corporate earnings represented new investment by the company's stockholders, and, if
so, what role the stockholders should have in deciding whether they wanted management
to reinvest their earnings or receive cash dividend payments or, for that matter, even liquidate the company.
Kaen, Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 120, at 812-13.
195. See, eg., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase,
Social Cost]. In other words:
Coase concluded that the firm replaced the market-price mechanism-for organizational
efficiency reasons and not for technological ones. The size of the firm was, therefore, an
economic decision variable and the key question relating to firm size became whether "At
the margin, the costs of organizing within the firm will be equal either to the costs involved
of organizingin anotherfirm (our emphasis) or to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be 'organized' by the price mechanism."

Kaen, Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 120, at 813 (quoting Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937)); see C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938, 15th
printing 1962); J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPrrALISM (1924); F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1965); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937)
[hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm].
196. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 195, at 386.
197. See Coase, Social Cost; supra note 195. As explained by Professor Coleman:
One way of stating Coase's theorem-the one that is thought to have the most relevance to law-and-economics- is: Given traditional assumptions of substantial knowledge,
perfect rationality and the absence of both transaction costs and income effects, the assignments of legal entitlements in cases of two-party incompatible land uses will be neutral as
to the goal of allocative efficiency.
3. COLEMAN, supranote 16, at 69 (footnotes omitted); see also French, The Extended Coase Theorem
and Long Run Equilibrium, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 254, 256 (1979) (Coase's theory is proper when
applied to property rights assignments but not when applied to liability).
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operation requires the merger of the distributive with the productive
aspects of legal practice. 198
Coleman thus suggests that efficiency "is not necessarily what rational parties
1 99
demand from legal rules themselves."
As noted above, the Berle and Means analysis fails to address how profits
should be distributed or deployed. In addition, the Berle and Means approach
does not explain sufficiently how the obligation to shareholders factors into the
total calculus of managerial decisions. 2° ° First, Berle and Means focused on
shareholder primacy. Some observers claim that, under such a model, there is
no room for social responsibility. 20 1 Similarly, under the Berle and Means approach, managers are asked to favor the interests of shareholders over other
corporate constituencies. For example, as a result of the ruling in Revlon, it is
now the law in Delaware that unless management has decided to try to keep the
company independent, management's sole obligation is to maximize shareholder
profits. 20 2 The court reasoned that once a company's management has decided
that the company is for sale, then the directors' focus must shift from the best
interests of the corporation to the best interests of the shareholders solely in
terms of their short-term investment objectives. Presumably, the court in Revlon decided that once target company management has decided that it can no
longer keep the company independent, it no longer has any say in the future of
the business. Such a ruling should be heralded by the contractarians as it promotes the goals of efficiency.
Has the current wave of contractarians forgotten about the lessons of the
1929 market crash and subsequent Great Depression? It is no great revelation
that the Great Depression was not simply an economic event-its political and
social consequences were severe. Perhaps an even more pertinent question is
whether much of the current basis for analysis unjustifiably eschews principles of
fair play in favor of an efficiency model.
Many efficient market proponents who claim to be value-neutral scoff at
terms such as fairness, fiduciary duties, and justice. Alternatively, economists
claim that fairness is defined in terms of efficiency and rational economic decisions.20 3 What many of these proponents fail to perceive is that their paradigm
198. J. COLEMAN, supra note 16; Coleman, Afterward, supra note 19, at 182-83.
199. Coleman, Afterward, supra note 19, at 190.
200. See, eg., Dodd, supra note 28, at 1152-53; Weiner, supra note 185, at 1462; see also Hazen
& Buckley, supra note 188, at 106-11 (examining perspectives on social responsibility of the private

corporation).
201. E.g., T. LEVIrr, THE THIRD SECTOR, NEW TAcTIcS FOR A RESPONSIVE SOCIETY (1973),

Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Friedman, The
Social Responsibility ofBusiness is to Increase its Profits, N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32; see
also Millon, supranote 50; Nesteruk, Corporations,Shareholders,andMoral Choice: A New Perspective on CorporateSocial Responsibility, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 451 (1989) (discussing the relationship
between corporate responsibility and moral decision making).
202. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)
(striking down "lock-up" option whereby target manager agreed to sell corporate assets to a "white
knight" to rebuff a hostile bidder); see supra text accompanying notes 86-87; see also Gilson &
Kraakman, What TriggersRevlon, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1990) (arguing that Revlon
should apply whenever a proposed transaction would shift control of the company).
203. See, eg., D. GAUTHIER, supra note 19.
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merely substitutes their values for those of others.2 °4 At least one leading law
and economics devotee has conceded that his views include the position that
efficiency is defensible as a moral principle.20 5 The difficulty with concepts such
as fairness and justice is that many people find them intuitively to be a part of
every calculus, yet they have difficulty articulating why in an intellectually satis20 6
fying way.
VI.

THE ROLE OF VALuEs

A. The ContractarianAnalysis and Values
A fallacy of the economic analysis is its contention that it is value-neutral.
Numerous commentators have shown that the laissez-faire results advocated by
20 7

the economic movement are no less value laden than the theories they decry.
For example, the bias of the economists who advocate deregulation of insider
trading should be readily apparent.
Originally some economists took a deregulatory position on insider trading
by arguing that when corporate insiders trade on inside information, their
purchases or sales help push stock prices in the right direction. 20 8 However,

these economists have never explained adequately why this was more efficient
than simply making a public announcement. They might respond that because

premature announcement of information could hurt the corporation, mandatory
disclosure is not the appropriate approach. In the face of economic evidence

that the volume of insider trading was not sufficient to have a significant impact
on the market, 20 9 the economic justification of insider trading shifted to one of

an efficient method by which management could establish their own compensation. 210 However, if efficiency is the goal, would it not be more efficient to have
corporations sell this valuable information? The purchaser of the information

would be able to retain his or her profit, and the corporation, not its managers,
would receive the benefits of the sale.2 11 Another way in which the economists'
204. See Bratton, supra note 48; Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L. REv. 999

(1987); see also Hazen, Management Buyouts and Corporate Governance Paradigms,25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1990) (recognition of the problems identified by Berle and Means would reemphasize
fiduciary obligations of corporations that would facilitate a healthier investment climate).
205. Eg., Posner, The Ethical andPoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HosrRA L. REv. 487, 500-02 (1980).
206. See, eg., Leff, supranote 181, at 482 ("I admit that it is not easy these days to be a moralist
marqud, when what it is that one lacks is any rational and coherent way to express one's
intuitions.").

207. For a criticism of the positivistic prejudices of the Chicago school of law and economics, see
B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-94 (1984). Within the context of corporate
law, some economists have argued that efficiency requires the legitimization of trading on inside
information. However, as Professor Cox explains, the economists' own argument can be used as an
argument against insider trading. See Cox Insider Tradingand Contracting: A CriticalResponse to
the "Chicago School," 1986 DuKE L.J. 628.
208. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
209. See, eg., Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Information: Theory and
Evidence, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 475, 492-99 (1986).
210. See, eg., Carney, Signallingand Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 863,
897-98 (1987).
211. See Cox, supra note 207; see also RESTATEMENT OF REsTITION § 200 (1937) (a fiduciary
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own argument undercuts their analysis is that if insider trading were to be unregulated and hence encouraged, who would invest in the market? The market
then could not be called efficient because price would not be based on the assimilation of all publicly available information, but simply upon the insiders' decision of whether they wanted to continue to own their corporation's stock. Thus,
even by their own analysis, the economists who advocate the permissibility of
insider trading cannot support their own position. Furthermore, as with the
case of other economic analysis of corporate law, the view that would permit
insider trading ignores commonly accepted concepts of fairness. 2 12
B.

Aggregate Versus Entity: The Relevance of Philosophy and Moral Theory
in Defining the CorporatePersona

Over the course of the history of the corporation, a debate has continued as
to whether a corporation is a separate entity or whether it is merely an aggregate
of its constituents. 213 The debaters are not limited to legal theorists. Philosophers have engaged in a similar inquiry with regard to whether the corporation
is a morally accountable individual. 2 14 Certainly, these debates provide insight
into the ways in which corporations are and should be governed. The aggregate/entity dichotomy can be helpful in analyzing both corporate internalities
and externalities by providing a forum for examining the relationship among the
various participants in the corporate enterprise as well as the relationship between the corporate participants and third parties. Some commentators have
suggested that the ongoing popularity of the legal concept of corporation as aggregate or entity can help explain the movement of corporate law away from
public regulation to a system of private law that focuses primarily upon the
allocation of power (and responsibilities) between the shareholders and managers. 2 15 This focus on shareholder or management supremacy has been questioned, first by the writers of the 1930s, 216 then by the commentators of the
1970s 2 17 and more recently by critical legal scholars. 2 18
who acquires property through the use of confidential information holds the property as a trustee);
Hazen, CorporateInsider Trading:Reawakening the Common Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 845
(1982) (exploring relevance of common law theories to insider trading); cf Diamond v. Oreamuno,
24 N.Y.2d 494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969) (court ordered insiders to
disgorge their profits from insider trading, reasoning that as agents of the corporation, any profits
from the trading belonged to the principal).
212. See, eg., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322 (1979); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967). Although it is an hyperbole,

which like most hyperboles means it proves too much, the argument that supports insider trading in
the name of efficiency can be analogized to Jonathan Swift's satiric essay, "AModest Proposal"

which presented the position that infanticide and cannibalism could be justified in the name of efficiency; see Hazen, Commentary, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 987, 993-96 (1987).
213. See, eg., W. ANDERSON, LIMITATIONS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY-A TREATISE OF
THE LAW RELATING TO THE OVERRIDING OF THE CORPORATE FictION § 31 (1931); G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 12 (1959); R. STEVENS, supra note 54, § 936.

214. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
215. See Millon, supra note 50.
216. See, eg., Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145

(1932).

217. E.g., C. STONE,

WHERE THE LAW ENDS

(1975); R.

NADER,

M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
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Early courts and commentators recognized that the corporation was an

"artificial being" possessing its own "individuality. ' 219 Historically, viewing the
corporation as an entity helped distinguish it from the partnership wherein the
partners, unlike corporate shareholders, do not enjoy limited liability. 2 20
Some observers contend that the Berle-Dodd debate on the proper focus of
managerial responsibility 22 1 has had implications for the entity/aggregate debate. They suggest that the shareholder supremacy proponents' rejection of the
social responsibility paradigm reflected a rejection of the entity theory of corporate existence in favor of an aggregate theory that focuses on the shareholders'
property rights.2 22 Viewed in this way, the contractarian analysis is a natural
progression from the Berle and Means shareholder supremacy model.
The contractarian model views the corporation as simply an aggregate of its
individual constituents. This view is a departure from the traditional one of the
corporation as a separate entity. As discussed above, 223 one of the errors of the
pure contractarian approach is that it views the corporation solely as an economic institution, a view which fails to recognize the fact that corporations are
also political and social institutions. Scholarly commentators in the fields of
philosophy and political theory have written on the theory of the firm. A brief
excursion into these disciplines will illustrate the insufficiency of the current economic analysis of corporate form and intracorporate obligations.
224
Moral theory is consistent with an economic view of corporateness.
225
Moreover, there is an interrelationship between ethical theory and the law.
226
Indeed, it is not antithetical to speak of ethics and business.
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Blumberg, Politicalizationof the Corporation,51 B.U.L.
REV. 425 (1971). These writers were primarily interested in democratizing the corporation among
all of its constituents.
218. See, eg., Singer, supra note 171; see also Morrissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1005, 1035-36 (1989) (suggesting that the corporate
purpose be framed in terms of "ethical and beneficent corporate conduct" in addition to the profit
motive).
219. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819) (Marshall, J.); see also J. ANGELL & S. AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 1 (10th ed. 1875) (stating that a corporation is "for certain purposes, considered as a
natural person"); cf R. STEVENS, supra note 54, at § 936 ("a realistic approach toward law is tending to substitute for the ancient theory that a fictitious person exists apart from the members for the
theory that the members themselves have a dual legal personality. The latter theory is not modem.
It is not revolutionary.").
220. See supra texts accompanying notes 1, 123-27 (discussing the partnership).
221. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
222. See Millon, supra note 50.
223. See supra notes 117-206 and accompanying text.
224. It is incorrect to say that markets by their very nature are amoral or immoral, although
many of their participants act either amorally or immorally. H. ACTON, THE MORALS OF MARKETS 19 (1971).
225. Ethics and law are both normative systems. Each system can interfere with profits. McCarty, Business, Ethics and Law, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 881, 881-84 (1988).
226. See, eg., Abratt & Sacks, The MarketingChallenge: Towards BeingProfitableand Socially
Responsible, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 497, 501-03 (1988) (business can be profitable and socially responsible
at the same time). But see GASKI, DANGEROUS TERRITORY: THE SOCIETAL MARKETING CONCEPT
REVISITED (1985). Professor Gaski observes differently:
The "social marketing" concept, or the view that marketing has a greater social responsibility than just satisfying customers at a profit, is an erroneous and counterproductive idea.
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Corporationsand MoralAgency. Moral philosophers define actors as moral
agents. Within this framework, much has been written as to whether a corporation is a moral agent separate and apart from its constituents. One school of
philosophical thought takes the position that the corporation is a moral
agent. 227 The moral agency approach finds parallel support in the long-standing
228
recognition in the law that the corporation is a distinct legal entity.
Another school of thought takes the position that the corporation (or any
2 29
organization, for that matter) is merely an aggregate of its participants.
Under such a view, the various individuals are their own moral agents and the
corporation has no separate individual responsibility. 230 This aggregate paradigm seems to comport with the contractarian model of corporate obligations.
In fact, the contractarian model of the corporation has been characterized as "a
novel and sophisticated" version of the aggregate paradigm. 231 By focusing on a

privatized system of relationships, the contractarian view carries forward the
aggregate paradigm's normative tradition.
For marketers to attempt to serve the best interests of society is not only undemocratic but
dangerous as well.

Id.
227. See, eg., French, supra note 49, at 209 (French points out that the legal aggregate theory is
contrary to the view held by courts and legislatures.); see also Goodpaster & Matthews, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?,60 HARV. Bus. REv. 132, 133-35 (1982) ("Organizational agents such as
corporations should be no more and no less morally responsible (rational, self-interested, altruistic)
than ordinary persons.... If a group can act like a person in some ways, then we can expect it to
behave like a person in other ways."); Goodpaster, The Principle of Moral Projection: A Reply to
ProfessorRanken, 6 J. Bus. ETHics 329, 330-32 (1987) (enlarging upon the moral agenda of management and the corporation as a participant in ethical transactions).
228. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819) (Marshall, J.); see alsoJ. ANGELL & S. AMES, supra note 219, at 1 (defining corporation through its rights
and obligations).
229. See generally Lewis, Collective Responsibility, 23 PHILOSOPHY 3 (1948) (placing blame for
collective action on collective agencies can be used as an excuse to let the guilty individuals "off the
hook"). It is significant that Lewis's observation was made shortly after the rise and fall of Nazi
Germany.
230. As explained by a leading commentator, "Legal aggregate theory of corporations holds that
the names of corporate bodies are only umbrellas that cover (but do not shield) certain biological
persons." French, supra note 49, at 209; see F. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1930). There
may be some support for this view in scattered cases. For example, in Daimler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., 2 A.C. 307, 340 (1916), the House of Lords adopted the aggregate
theory by stating that the individuals and corporate persona are in pari materia and the acts of
corporations are "attributable only to human beings." In so ruling the House of Lords reversed the
Court of Appeals, which had held that a corporation is a person created by statute and thus had a
separate personality from its members.
It has also been suggested that since individuals freely choose organizational association, they
cannot disassociate themselves from the harmful consequences of collective acts. Because individuals benefit from the acts of a corporation, they never act completely impersonally. There is usually
latitude for an individual to exercise moral judgment when considering collective acts. Flores &
Johnson, Collective Responsibility andProfessionalRoles, 93 ETHIcs 537 (1983); see also Thompson,
Collective Responsibility and ProfessionalRoles, 5 J. Bus. ETHIcs 151, 154 (1986) ("[M]oral agency
can be collective, individual, or both. Flores and Johnson give some initial guidelines for evaluating
situations in which individuals are responsible, but the final answer will depend upon the place of
individual's actions within the decision structure of the collective as well.").
231. Millon claims that the aggregate theory has dominated corporate law since the 1930s and
has been interpreted to mean that corporate law should focus only on the welfare of the shareholders. However, this is a rather narrow view of the law in the mid and later part of the twentieth
century. As pointed out elsewhere, corporate law did not lose its public thrust. See Millon, supra
note 5R
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However, even if one accepts an aggregate view of corporateness, the contractarian's death knell for fiduciary accountability is not a necessary conclusion. When entering into contracts with one another, the various corporate
actors are assuming various reciprocal obligations. 232 The aggregate that com233
prises the corporation consists of various components, including employees.
The contractarians do not deny that there are corporate constituencies beyond
the shareholders. They claim, however, that these constituencies can protect
234
themselves through contracting.

The continued viability of the fiduciary model among other things will determine the extent to which corporations (and hence corporate managers) have a
duty to be socially responsible citizens in society. As discussed above, the corporate form exists solely by virtue of the state. 235 The corporate form brings with
it limited liability, a benefit that otherwise would have to be bargained for between businesses and the third parties with which they deal. Because the state
provides the corporate franchise, a bargaining model would call for consideration flowing the other way. The consideration flowing to the state is the ability
to impose public regulation on corporate conduct. The traditional fiduciary
model of the corporation gives the shareholders not only the protections of limited liability but also makes them the beneficiaries of the fiduciary obligations of
the corporate managers. Consistent with this framework is the argument that,
as part of the bargain with the state that gives the shareholders these benefits,
the shareholders (and in turn the corporation) must recognize that they are responsible members of the community. As such, the contract can be said to inlude obligations to constituencies other than the shareholders.
There is an ongoing debate over the extent to which corporations have an
obligation to be socially responsible citizens.236 Viewing the corporation as an
aggregate does not undermine the notion that corporations have an obligation to
232. It has been suggested that organizations want decision makers who can deal with value

considerations arising from ethical issues:
The tenets of "values clarification" and "values analysis" suggest that the following guidelines can provide a basis for resolving values conflicts within the individual and between the
individual and the organization. Organizational members must:
(1) be active in developing and defending their own positions,
(2) be challenged to probe deeply the justifications for human choices, especially their
own,

(3) confront standards and points of view that counter their personal perspectives,
(4) be encouraged and enabled to assume the role of someone with a contrasting point

of view, and
(5) wrestle with problems that have no simple solutions.
Coye, Individual Values and Business Ethics, 5 J. Bus. ETHICS 45, 46 (1986); see also R. MORRILL,
TEACHING VALUES IN COLLEGE 4-8

(1980).

233. See, eg., C. Stone, supra note 217; Singer, supra note 171, at 618-23; Summers,
Codeterminationin the UnitedStates: A ProjectionofProblems and Potentials,4 COMP. CORP. LAW
& SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
234. Eg., Macey, Externalities,Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 174.
235. See supra text accompanying note 54.
236. See, eg., C. STONE, supra note 217, at 74-118; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 217, at 258-60; Blumberg, supra note 217, at 457-61; Hazen & Buckley, supra note 188.
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be socially responsible citizens. 2 37 If the aggregate theory is accepted, then corporate managers necessarily owe obligations not only to various constituencies
within the corporation (for example, shareholders and employees), but also to
the community at large.
The economists' laissez-faire conclusion is a product of a rational system of
decision making that views efficiency or profit-maximization as the end goal.
The fact that a corporation is an entity does not necessarily mean that it must

act in accordance with moral principles. In the first place, the economists' efficiency model derives from a utilitarian philosophy that established efficiency as a

moral principle. 238 As explained by Richard Posner, "Bentham's utilitarianism,
in its aspect as a positive theory of human behavior, is another name for eco-

nomic theory." 2 39 On the other hand, it may appear that an efficiency model is

based on rationality rather than morality. John Ladd analyzed the legitimacy of
such a rationalist approach to organizational behavior. 24° He argued that under
principles of organizational behavior, corporations cannot act as a matter of
moral principle. 241 Ladd then described what he sees as a paradox, contending
237. According to one commentator:
Ultimately, a theory of Corporate Strategy must take into account the values of individuals
engaged in collective economic action.... In principle, this is an obligation borne by all
parties to the operation of the common marketplace. In specific application, this duty can
be manifest in the form of an institutional contract binding the firm's agents and relevant
constituents to respect the rights of all parties to a transaction or series of transactions.
These rights are those necessary for the pursuit of socially-effective economic projects. In
summary, we might expect the Invisible Hand to emerge clasped in the grasp of the Willing
Handshake, a viable avenue, I propose, to effective collective action, through attention to
human rights.
Gilbert, CorporateStrategy and Ethics, 5 J. Bus. ETHIcs 137, 149 (1986).
238. See, eg., Michelman, Property, Utility, andFairness"Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.L. REv. 1165, 1208-18 (1967); see also R. POSNER, supra
note 12 at 4 ("Efficiency is a technical term: it means exploiting economic resources in such a way
that human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services is maximized. Value too is defined by willingness to pay.").
239. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 357.
240. Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationalityin FormalOrganizations,54 THE MONIST 488
(1970).
241. Ladd's approach has been summarized as follows:
1. Corporate, military, and governmental organizations are formal organizations.
2. A formal organization is a decision-making structure characterized by:
a. a goal or set of goals,
b. the concept of an organizational (or "social") act or decision whereby an individual,
as an agent for the organization, makes decisions for and on behalf of the
organization,
c. a hierarchical structure of authority for establishing and implementing organiza-

tional decisions, and
d. a standard of rationality according to which the rational organizational act is the one
that best achieves the organization's goal(s).
3. The only way moral principles could enter into organizational decision making is by
either being organizational goals or limiting operating conditions.
4. All limiting operating conditions are factual conditions.
5. Moral principles are not factual conditions.
6. Moral principles are not organizational goals.
7. Therefore, organizational decisions cannot be based on moral principles.
Long & Snoeyenbos, Ladd on Morality and Formal Organizations, in BUSINESS EHics 61 (M.
Snoeyenbos, R. Almeder & J. Humber eds. 1983).
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that the rational model of organizational behavior24 2 creates a moral schizo-

phrenia on the part of individuals within an organization because the individuals
who are the organizational actors and decision makers do have moral principles.
These principles in turn create a conflict with the amorality of the firm. 2 4 3 On
the one hand, if organizations give up the idea of rationality, Ladd maintains
that we cannot find the most efficient solutions to our problems. On the other
hand, "if we give up the standard of ordinary moral conduct, then in effect we
destroy ourselves as moral beings and reduce our relationships to each other to
purely mechanical and materialistic ones." 244 Notwithstanding Professor
Ladd's approach, viewing the corporation as a separate entity does not negate
the fact that a corporation must be mindful of its effects upon the community in
which it exists. As an entity, a formal organization can be as much a moral
agent as an individual. 245
Even if one accepts the aggregate view of organizational obligations, the
history of corporations in our tradition justifies a less individualistic and more
communitarian approach. 24 6 The aggregate view departs from what has been
the legal norm for corporations since their inception. One of the chief attributes
of the corporate personality in the eyes of the law is that it always has been
viewed as an entity, separate and apart from its members. 2 47 In contrast, a partnership traditionally has been viewed as an aggregate of the partners, 248
although even the partnership is recognized as a separate entity for some purposes. 249 Thus, assuming for the moment that those who would not attribute
any moral agency to organizations generally are correct, the law has always
taken a contrary view with regard to corporations.
Communitarianism as a theory of individual morality denies the existence
242. Cf Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions,59 J. Bus.'S251
(1986) (challenging the rational-actor model for individuals); see also Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. Rv. 669, 678-85 (1979)
(claiming the Coase theorem fails to account for that fact that people treat opportunity cost income
differently than realized income); cf Schelling, Self-Command in Practice,in Policy, and in the Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1984) (discussing the phenomena of "anticipatory
self-command").
243. Ladd, supra note 240, at 500-01.

244. Id. at 512.
245. See, eg., Almeder, Morality in the Marketplace, in BUSINESS ETHICS 84 (1. Snoeyenbos,
R. Almeder & J. Humber eds. 1983); Almeder, The Ethics of Profit: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, Bus. AND Soc'Y 7 (Winter 1980); Gilbert, supra note 237.
246. Communitarianism is a philosophy that is said to offer an alternative to individualism. See,
eg., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LiMIrs OF JUSTICE 147-54 (1982). It has been suggested
that a communitarian approach to corporate law has some implications for corporate conduct.
First, the corporation is not simply an aggregate of its constituents, it has its own personality. Second, as a member of a broader community, the corporation has "broader ethical and philanthropic
concerns" than the profit motive. See Morrisey, supra note 218, at 1035-38 (suggesting that the
corporate purpose be framed in terms of "ethical and beneficent corporate conduct" in addition to
the profit motive).
247. See, eg., G. FIELD, supra note 137, § 449.

248. 1 A.

BROMBERG

& L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 123, § 103.

249. For example, statutes that set forth the appropriate methods for service of process generally
treat the partnership as an entity. Also, the tax laws treat the partnership as an entity for some
purposes. Id.
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of neutral principles. 250 Instead, it focuses on the relationship of the individual

to the community (which consists of an aggregate of individuals). However
sound or unsound the status of communitarianism as a theory about individual
morality, if we believe that there is a morality applicable to corporations, then it

must be communitarianism. Recognizing the corporation as a moral agent does
not negate the fact that the firm does consist, at least in part, of an aggregate of

individuals. 251 Furthermore, as a moral agent, the corporation owes certain ob-

ligations not only to its constituents but also to the community in which it
operates.
Even if the corporation is an aggregate rather than a morally responsible
individual, the aggregate of individuals that makes up the corporation is a community. Under principles of communitarianism, the utilitarian analysis that
supports current economic contract theory of the firm cannot withstand scrutiny
as the ultimate paradigm.
VII.

A.

OTHER MODELS OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE

The Power Model of Corporations

In a recent article, Professor Lynne Dallas sets forth a power model of
corporate structure. 25 2 According to the power model, corporate relationships

can be explained best as power struggles between various coalitions within the
corporate entity. 253 The essence of the power model is apparent from its comparison to the contract model. 25 4 In the contract model, the firm is viewed as a
nexus of contracts and is reactive to its environment. By contrast, the power
model is based on power coalitions that are proactive with respect to the firm's

environment. 255 The contract paradigm portrays management as an agent of
the firm. Under the power model, management is the embodiment of the dominant coalition.2 5 6 The contractarians describe the goal of the corporation as
250. See, eg., M. SANDEL, supra note 246, at 59-65, 147-54; Regan, Community and Justice,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1073. This, of course, is a rejection of Rawls' approach. See J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
251. In fact, it might well be said that this is a situation wherein the whole exceeds the sum of its
parts.
252. Dallas, supra note 74, at 25-29 (1988); see also C. LINDBLOM, POLmCS AND MARKETS
(1977); Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 565; Macneil, Economic Analysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the
Needfor a "Rich ClassificatoryApparatus", 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1980).
253. See Dallas, supra note 74, at 31 ("Firm behavior results from a contest for control among
power coalitions comprised of groups of individuals in specific relationships to the firm and with
each other."); W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS 248 (1981)
(The power model "presumes that intradepartmental conflict is not primarily a product of error,
ambiguity, and ignorance but results from quite fundamental divergences in group interests; and that
the struggles are not concerned simply with the means but concern the goals to be served by the
organization."); see also R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); H.
MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND QRGANIZATIONS (1983); J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, THE
EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978);
Tomlinson, Economic andSociological Theories of the EnterpriseandIndustrialDemocracy, 35 BRIT.
J. Soc. 591, 602 (1984).
254. Or efficiency model.
255. Dallas, supra note 74, at 29.
256. Id.
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profit maximization, 257 while the power model recognizes that the corporation
embodies multiple inconsistent goals.25 8 Contractarians rely solely on competition in the market as the determinant of corporate structure and behavior,
whereas the power model recognizes various sources of power. 259 In contrast to
holding up contract as the essence of the management shareholder relationship,
the power model speaks in terms of "co-optation," a process by which management utilizes the shareholders to provide legitimacy for its power base.2 6° Finally, while the contract model views the board of directors as a monitoring
'262
device,2 61 the power model views the board as a" 'tool' of internal coalition.
The efficiency model is rooted in a sort of economic Darwinism and natural
selection. In contrast, the power model views the corporation within its social,
263
cultural, and political context.
The power model demonstrates the contract model's failure to perceive the
ways in which the various corporate constituencies relate to one another. It has
long been recognized that the various corporate constituencies have divergent
interests. 264 The contract model assumes that bargaining is the most efficient
way to reconcile these differences. Under a contract model, the quid pro quo (or
consideration) in contract formation provides adequate compensation for the
losers in the allocation of power. The power model demonstrates that the various constituencies do not come to the bargaining table with equal bargaining
power. Not only is the bargaining unequal, it is wholly one-sided in favor of
management. Traditional contract law utilizes various doctrines such as unconscionability 265 to police bargains that have not been reached as a result of arm's
length bargaining. The doctrine of unconscionability has not gone without its
critics, however. These critics claim that it represents an unwarranted interference with freedom of contract. 266 The courts, in point of fact, generally refrained from interfering except in the extreme case in which it cannot fairly be
267
said that the parties bargained for and thus actually consented to the bargain.
257. And, correlatively, cost minimization.
258. Within this framework, the power model also works towards increased autonomy and dis-

cretion of the various power coalitions. Dallas, supra note 74, at 29.

259. Id
260. Id. In other words: "The relationship between shareholders and management in a large
public corporation is then one of formal cooptation. The purpose of formal cooptation is to provide
a 'front' or 'aura of respectability' for the powerholder." Id. at 95; see P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE
GRASSROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION 260 (1949).
261. Dallas, supra note 74, at 29.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 97-98.
264. See, eg., A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976).
265. See, eg., U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 comment c (1979);
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 752-54 (1982); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
266. See, eg., Epstein, Unconscionability: A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J. L. & EcON. 293 (1975);
Schwartz, Seller Unequal BargainingPower and-the JudicialProcess, 49 IND. L.J. 367, 369 (1974).
Some critics have attacked the doctrine of unconscionability "as a cover for smuggling notions of
distributive justice into the judicial process." E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CONTRACrs--CASES
AND MATERIALS 393 (4th ed. 1988).
267. Eg., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (cross collateralization clause of revolving credit account remanded for determination of unconscionability);
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Of course, not all unequal bargains will (or should) be invalidated. 268 In
most cases, the market and not the judiciary is the appropriate forum for allocating rights in a bargained-for exchange. In other words, the "right" to enter into
a bad bargain is one element of the freedom to contract. On those occasions,
however, when courts are faced with a clearly one-sided bargain, they nevertheless are reluctant to interfere because of their view that the matter is more properly a concern for the legislature. 269 However, courts will interfere in an
appropriate case. When carried from the law of contracts to the realm of corporate law, the contract paradigm calls for a correlative function of policing the
bargain. In this regard, it must not be forgotten that the corporation is a creature of statute. The corporate franchise thus is conditioned upon the state imposing limits on corporate activity and power arrangements among the various
corporate constituencies. Just as contract doctrine has interposed various policing devices in the context of unequal bargaining power, the fiduciary obligation
has a similar necessary role in defining relationships with the corporation.
Recent Delaware decisions demonstrate how the courts have struggled over
the proper allocation of power between managers and shareholders. As discussed more fully above,270 in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,27 1 the Delaware Supreme Court held that once a corporation is "for sale,"
management's responsibility is limited to value maximization for the shareholders by seeking (or at least not interfering with the quest for) the highest price for
their shares. More recently, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc.,272 the Delaware Court of Chancery, in a decision that was affirmed by the
bid by acquirsupreme court, held that management could respond to a hostile
2 73
ing another company without violating the Revlon principle.
The power model demonstrates that the relative power positions of the various corporate constituencies justifies some interference with the unfettered recognition of what some economists describe as the contract rights of corporate
management. The essence of the contract model is freedom of contract. Freedom of contract is meaningful only to the extent that the parties can be said to
be acting out of uncoerced consent. Recognition of the relative power positions

of the various corporate constituencies belies unrestrained notions of freedom of
contract within the corporation. Freedom of contract should be recognized only
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (disclaimer of warranty for
personal injury to consumer held unconscionable and hence unenforceable).
268. Eg., O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958)
(upholding exculpatory clause releasing landlord from liability for his negligence).
269. Id. at 441, 155 N.E.2d at 547; see generally Dawson, Economic Duress- An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1947) (surveying the development of the law of duress).
270. See supra texts accompanying notes 86-110, 202.
271. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (striking down "lock-up" option whereby target manager agreed
to sell corporate assets to a "white knight" in order to rebuff a hostile bidder).
272. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d

280 (Del. 1989).
273. By entering into a defensive merger, Time's management effectively defeated the hostile
offer by Paramount. The Paramount offer was to purchase Time shares at a price far in excess of
either the pre or post defensive merger price. Accordingly, the Time/Warner deal effectively
stopped the Paramount offer and thereby interfered with an auction for the Time shares.
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to the extent that it can fairly be said that the terms of the agreement are not the
result of management's coercion of the other corporate constituencies.
B.

The Contractariansand CriticalLegal Analysis

Economic analysis is only one of three current strains in legal scholarship.
Two other emerging camps are the critical legal theorists 274 and feminist schol-

ars. 275 In large part, the "crits" and the feminist writings arose in reaction to
the Chicago school of economic approach to the law. One does not have to be a
devotee of either of these two doctrinal schools, however, to appreciate that each

can provide us with alternative perspectives on long-standing problems.

Although there has not been a substantial body of critical legal theory or feminist writing in the area of corporate law, these doctrinal positions can provide
some useful insights. For example, the lesson from critical legal analysis is that
we must view law as contextualized. 276 As such, an awareness of the role of
corporate law as both public and private law is crucial. 277 By viewing corporations in their historical, political, and social context, one can see that the contract model is far from a new development. 278 Furthermore, a proper
understanding of contract law shows that it is concerned with more than merely
279
deregulation and laissez-faire economics. For example, as discussed above,
fiduciary principles have been an important part of contract law, especially
within the context of business organizations (whether in the form of partnerships or corporations). Feminist scholars suggest that, because relationships
form an important part of human conduct, the law should put more emphasis on
relationships than upon abstract principles. 280 A feminist analysis of corporate
law would reveal that over time the relational aspect of the corporate entity has
been recognized in various ways. 281 Because the corporate form consists of a
274. For some representative scholarship dealing with critical legal theory, see CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (A. Hutchinson ed. 1989); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys
ed. 1982); M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
275. See, e.g., Scales, The Emergence of FeministJurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373
(1986).
276. See supra note 274.
277. Millon, supra note 50.
278. See, e.g., W. CLARK, supra note 137, § 73, at 202 ("it is now settled beyond any controversy
that the charter of a private corporation is a contract within the meaning of the constitution"); C.
ELLIOTT, supra note 54, § 24; W. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE § 255 (1882); S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2 (2d ed. 1908); see also Bratton, supra note 45, at 1472-73:
History ... shows that contract always has held a constitutive place in corporate legal
theory ....
Historically, contract has had an equal, or more often subordinate, position in
corporate legal theory - a position closely grounded in and responsive to economic practice. . . . It [the contract model] constitutes a significant innovation in neoclassical
microeconomic theory. But, outside that limited methodological context, it is merely the
latest in a long series of attempts to describe and justify the phenomenon of collective

production in individualist terms.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
280. See, eg., Scales, supranote 275, at 1384-88 (discussing the incompatibility of "rights based"
(male) and "care based" (female) approaches).
281. However, the feminists nevertheless would decry the combative, confrontational approach
of the law. See id.
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number of relational interests, the law quite properly has focused on fiduciary as
well as contract principles in defining the corporate paradigm.
This Article does not suggest that critical legal theory or feminist analysis
should form the basis for revamping our corporate law. At least some strains of
these two schools of legal analysis can be useful. Similarly, I am not suggesting
that adherents to a law and economics analysis have not made significant contributions. Indeed, economic analysis must play a significant role in shaping our
corporate law. However, that principle is quite different from saying that economic analysis mandates a contractarian laissez-faire model of corporate law.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, economic analysis has had a profound effect on the law. Within
the past twenty years, adherents to the Chicago school of economics have forced
a reevaluation of many doctrinal aspects of the law. Like any paradigm, economic models are useful for testing hypotheses upon which the law is built. The
economic model, however, does not (and cannot) provide all of the answers to
the question of how the law should be formed.
The role of economic analysis within the context of corporate law bears out
the above-mentioned observations. Because corporate law regulates business,
economic analysis must play a significant role in defining our view of the corporation and, in turn, our view of the proper focus of corporate law.
The contractarian model of the firm is not new and, within limits, may be
helpful in deciding upon the proper scope of business regulation. The paradigm
of the corporation as a nexus of contracts can prove to be valuable, but only to
the extent that it can fairly be said that the various parties in fact have consented
to the agreements that comprise the firm. As the power model indicates, the
relative power positions of the various corporate constituencies call for some
moderation of the contract model. The essence of the contract model is freedom
of contract. Freedom of contract is meaningful only to the extent that the parties can be said to be acting out of uncoerced consent. The fiduciary paradigm is
a necessary limitation on the right to contract within the corporate setting. This
limitation on freedom of contract is warranted because of the recognition of the
relative unequal power positions of the various corporate constituencies. The
fiduciary principle also is applicable because a corporation is not only an economic institution but is also a powerful political and social institution. As such,
the corporate paradigm must be evaluated in light of societal values rather than
the allegedly neutral 28 2 economic model. Finally, corporate managers make decisions concerning the deployment of the shareholders' capital. Corporate managers are in fact managing other people's money.283 This is yet a further reason
for retaining the fiduciary paradigm.

282. As discussed earlier, economic analysis can be as value laden as any other disciplinary
focus. Thus, the current wave of economic thought has a deregulation bias in order to uphold
freedom of contract.

283. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES' MONEY (1913).

